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This dissertation is arranged as a series of standalone articles. Section 1, titled: “What 
Complexity Theories Have to Say About Learning: A Review of the Literature” reviews 
the literature on complexity science and on learning theories and identifies intersections 
between research on complex and research on learning. Section 2, titled: “Order in chaos: 
Scale-invariant behaviors in Participatory Simulations” is an empirical research article 
that investigates the occurrence of scale invariance in learners’ classroom activity. 
Section 3, titled: “Complex Systems as Content and Structure in a Learning Theories 
Course” is intended to inform teachers’ practice and to begin to infuse a theory of 
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From metaphors to mathematized models, the complexity sciences are changing 
the ways disciplines view their worlds, and ideas borrowed from complexity are 
increasingly being used to structure conversations and guide research on teaching and 
learning. The purpose of this corpus of research is to further those conversations and to 
extend complex systems ideas, theories, and modeling to curricula and to research on 
learning and teaching. A review of the literatures of learning and of complexity science 
and a discussion of the intersections between those disciplines are provided. The work 
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reported represents an evolving model of learning qua complex system and that evolution 
is the result of iterative cycles of design research.  
One of the signatures of complex systems is the presence of scale invariance and 
this line of research furnishes empirical evidence of scale invariant behaviors in the 
activity of learners engaged in participatory simulations.  The offered discussion of 
possible causes for these behaviors and chaotic phase transitions in human learning 
favors real-time optimization of decision-making as the means for producing such 
behaviors. Beyond theoretical development and modeling, this work includes the 
development of teaching activities intended to introduce pre-service mathematics and 
science teachers to complex systems. While some of the learning goals for this activity 
focused on the introduction of complex systems as a content area, we also used complex 
systems to frame perspectives on learning.  
Results of scoring rubrics and interview responses from students illustrate 
attributes of the proposed model of complex systems learning and also how these pre-
service teachers made sense of the ideas. Correlations between established theories of 
learning and a complex adaptive systems model of learning are established and made 
explicit, and a means for using complex systems ideas for designing instruction is 
offered. It is a fundamental assumption of this research and researcher that complex 
systems ideas and understandings can be appropriated from more complexity-developed 
disciplines and put to use modeling and building increasingly productive understandings 
of learning and teaching.  
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SECTION 1  
 
 
WHAT COMPLEXITY THEORIES HAVE TO SAY ABOUT LEARNING: A 




 Systems approaches that try to understand experience generally by looking at 
multiple sources of activity or interest and the relationships between them are becoming 
increasingly prevalent and important in widely disparate disciplines. The purpose of this 
paper is to undertake a discussion of the use of systems-theoretical approaches, 
particularly “dynamical systems” theories, for making sense of learning. The article 
begins with a general review of the development of systems-theoretical perspectives and 
then explores three of these in detail. These sections are followed by a consideration of 
some of the affordances of systems approaches for efforts at understanding learning.  
GENERAL SYSTEMS APPROACHES 
The use of systems-theoretical approaches for trying to understand experience is 
not new (van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 4). As has been pointed out by Chen and Stroup 
(1993), Aristotle’s “whole is greater than the sum of the parts” is perhaps the oldest 
recorded axiom of systems theory, but it seems reasonable that thinking about aggregates 
of “agents” (geese or cattle or armies) creating global patterns (Vs or stampedes or 
battles) predates Aristotle by quite a bit. From the ancient, to modern, to the present, the 
use and development of these types of stances have been recurrent events. What is 
relatively new however is an interdisciplinary effort toward developing a mathematized 
formalization of general systems-theoretical phraseology and methods into something 
approaching what John Casti (1994) refers to as a “science of surprise” (p. 15). 
The bulk of modern scientific and mathematical thinking for the past several 
hundred years has been predominantly about dividing experience and phenomena into 
increasingly smaller parts in efforts to understand our world. However, over about the 
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last half century, when human enterprise has turned to describing, explaining, or 
predicting dynamical activities, various strains of (holistic) systems-mathematical 
approaches have sometimes been invoked. Chen and Stroup (1993, p. 449) credit Lotka 
(1920/1956) with the establishment of the underpinnings of a science of systems based on 
his pioneering work in biology. Ludwig von Bertalanffy is probably the “father” of 
modern systems theory, publishing his seminal volume, General Systems Theory in 1968. 
Jay Forrester published Principles of Systems (1968) at about the same time. These two 
books and authors have gone a long way toward establishing a science of systems, laying 
out a cohesive framework fundamental terminology, categories, and processes of 
generalized systems perspectives and explicating their ideas with examples from the 
physical, biological, and social fields (Bertalanffy, 1968, chap. 1). 
As mentioned above, Bertalanffy and Forrester are credited with building a 
“‘new’ field of study” (Chen & Stroup, 1993, p. 451), much more recently other authors 
have published systems-theoretical points of view (e.g., Casti, 1994; Camazine, 2001; 
Clark, 1997; Holland, 1995, 1998; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, 1997), and the field is 
still rapidly expanding. Most notably for the purposes of this article, Jean Piaget 
developed major portions of his theories of human development around the idea of the 
algebraic group, “A mathematical group is a system consisting of a set of elements (e.g., 
the integers, positive and negative) together with an operation or rule of combination” 
(Piaget, 1968/1970, p. 18). He goes on to clarify the relationship between elements and 
operations:  
If the character of structured wholes depends on their laws of composition, these 
laws must of their very nature be structuring: it is the constant duality, or 
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bipolarity, of always being structuring and structured that accounts for the 
success of the notion of law or rule employed by structuralists. …a structure’s 
laws of composition are defined “implicitly,” i.e., as governing the 
transformations of the system they structure. (p. 10) 
Piaget’s mutuality between the elements of the group and the operations that structure it 
correlates nicely with Bertalanffy’s (1968) definition of system: 
A system can be defined as a set of elements standing in interrelations. 
Interrelation means that elements, p, stand in relations R, so that the behavior of 
an element p in R is different from its behavior in another relation, R′. (p. 55-56) 
Viewing human development and learning in terms congruent with a systems-theoretical 
perspective, at least insofar as Piaget’s meanings of system and group and Bertalanffy’s 
are decidedly similar, reaches back to Piaget’s work in the middle part of the last century. 
 Bertalanffy (1968) and Forrester (1968) established the fundamentals of general 
systems-theoretical approaches, but many others have published works that further help to 
formalize and increase the meanings and potential utility of systems perspectives (Camazine, 
et al., 2001; Casti, 1994; Clark, 1997; Holland, 1995, 1998; Kauffman, 1995; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984, 1997). There is also an increasing number of academic centers and institutes 
devoted to the study of complex systems: the Santa Fe Institute, Argonne National Labs, 
International Solvay Institutes for Physics and Chemistry, and the New England Complex 
Sciences Institute1 are representative of the levels of national and international interest in 
these new approaches for developing disciplinary and interdisciplinary systems 
understandings. Although a thorough discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper, it 
seems reasonable to assert that large-scale Kuhnian (1962) paradigm shifts towards systems-
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theoretical thinking are taking place in a very wide range of disciplinary fields. No less an 
authority than Stephen Hawking has been quoted as saying “I think the next century will be 
the century of complexity” (Davis & Simmt, 2003, p. 137). 
 For example, there has been a huge expansion in discussions and implementation 
of systems-theoretical perspectives in almost every corner of the educational research 
community. From the recently formed “Complexity Special Interest Group” at the annual 
meeting of the American Education Research Association to the International Society of 
Learning Sciences to the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics 
Education, complexity and “systems” are beginning to find their ways into much of the 
thinking and theorizing on schooling and learning. Although much of the work being 
done on complexity and learning is of very high quality (Ennis, 1992; Kieren & Simmt, 
2002; Thelen & Smith, 1996; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999), there is also a tendency in the 
field to promote work that is vague, sensationalizing, or poorly considered. This is 
unfortunate because popularized and sensationalized discussions of complexity do very 
little good in furthering understandings of teaching, learning, and schooling, and they 
may do quite a bit of harm in terms of diminishing the credibility of the application of 
systems-theoretical perspectives to education. We share John Casti’s (1994, p. 270) hopes 
for more theoretically grounded, mathematized and formalized approaches in the 
application of systems theories in general and to educational research in particular. 
 There is an important distinction to be made in a discussion of systems-theoretical 
approaches and education. Two general perspectives can be found in the literature—one 
is related to teaching and learning about complex systems (e.g., Resnick & Wilensky, 
1998), the other is related to learning as a complex system (e.g., Ennis, 1992; Hurford, 
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1998; Thelen & Smith, 1996). Although “learning about” and “learning as” are apt to be 
mutually informative and learning about complexity and systems analyses is arguably an 
increasingly important candidate for school curricula, the primary focus in this discussion 
is on learning as a complex system.  
In-Depth View of Three Systems Perspectives  
The purpose of this section is to discuss in some detail three different systems-
theoretical perspectives. We begin with John Casti’s (1994) book, Complexification: 
Explaining a Paradoxical World Through the Science of Surprise, and follow that with a 
discussion of Camazine, et al. (2001), Self-organization in Biological Systems, and end 
the section with John Holland’s (1995) Hidden order: How Adaptation Builds 
Complexity. This order of discussion has been chosen because it represents increasing 
levels of specificity and applicability to systems of learners–that is, to classrooms2. 
Casti’s book identifies several familiar “complexity generators” and describes the 
necessity of developing new modeling tools for the purposes of understanding complex 
systems. This article then turns to Camazine et al., in order to consider one “formalized” 
approach at understanding how complex patterns emerge from the activities of multi-
agent systems, and finally treats Holland’s work because it seems to do the best job of 
rising to the closing challenge in Casti’s Complexification: 
For complexity to become a science, it is necessary–but far from sufficient–to 
formalize our intuitive notions about complexity in symbols and syntax… the 
creation of a science of complex systems is really a subtask of the more general, 
and much more ambitious, program of creating a theory of models. (pp. 277-278)  
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Each of these books, in its own way, sheds new and powerful light on the projects of 
modeling in general and on theory building about classroom learning in particular. 
John Casti: Toward a Science of Complexity 
 For Casti (1994), systems are collections of elements or agents together with 
some sort of “binder”–a set of rules or operations that help to delimit the system–that 
helps to determine just which things are inside and outside of the system. He also points 
out another piece to the puzzle of studying systems and it seems like a very important 
subtlety. It is that “no system lives in isolation” (p. 278), that is, any time we look at a 
system, we always do so from the context of another system. This becomes important, 
because, as the author puts it, “complexity is an inherently subjective concept; what is 
complex depends on how you look… whatever complexity such systems have is a joint 
property of the system and it is interaction with another system, most often an observer or 
a controller” (p. 269). Systems are understood in interaction with other systems. This key 
aspect of Casti’s systems perspective tells us that complexity is a subjective phenomenon: 
systems become complex (or not) as a function of the vantage point of the observer.  
The term “complex” may be thus ill defined, or at least multiply defined, 
representing different things for different people and in different contexts. One of the 
goals of Complexification is to begin to “translate some of these informal notions about 
the complex and the commonplace into a more formal, stylized language” (p. 270). Casti 
wants to move informal notions of complexity toward  “a science” essentially by 
rendering those notions down to formalisms and relations that can be expressed using the 
“compact language of mathematics” (p. 3). 
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 A first step in this process can be made by saying what complex systems are not. 
What they are not are simple systems: systems that have predictable behaviors, that 
involve “a small number of components” and “few interactions and feedback/feedforward 
loops” (Casti, 1994, p. 271). Simple systems generally have a very limited number of 
components and they are decomposable–if connections between components are broken 
the system still functions pretty much as it did before. By counter-example we can begin 
to see what complex systems are: they involve many components (elements, agents), and 
they are highly interconnected and interactive, involving multiple negative and positive 
feedback/feedforward loops. They are characterized by decentralized and distributed 
decision making and they are irreducible – “neglecting any part of the process or severing 
any of the connections… usually destroys essential aspects of the system’s behavior” (p. 
272).  
Complexity is the foundation of a science of surprise and surprise occurs literally 
when our expectations and observations are at odds with each other. Casti (1994) 
prefaces five chapters with what he calls “intuitions,” actually, misconceptions, about 
how the world behaves, that have their genesis in linear and simplistic models, and that 
routinely lead to unanticipated and surprising results.  
Before proceeding, it should be made clear that this entire section on Casti’s 
Complexification is intended to inform a developing understanding of classroom learning. 
Here the class is being viewed as a community of learners and an obviously complex 
system and the previous paragraph describes nicely why classrooms should be viewed as 
such–they are not simple, as defined above, and they are complex. Classrooms are 
composed of many agents–learners and teachers–and each is a decision-maker whose 
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deciding can affect any fraction of the total population. The elements are highly 
interconnected and irreducible–removing or adding elements always changes the 
dynamics and the classroom activity is characterized by multiple feedforward/feedback 
loops. Having said this about the classroom, let us continue with a brief treatment (Table 
1.1) of Casti’s “causes” of surprise and try and point to a way in which each may be 
related to classroom learning. 
 
Table 1.1 
Casti’s (1994) “Intuitions” and “Surprises,” and Classroom Learning. 
Intuition Surprise In Classroom Learning 
#1. Small, gradual changes 
in causes give small, 
gradual changes in effects. 
(p. 43) 
Catastrophe theory–small 
changes in parameters can 
lead to large discontinuous 
shifts in related values. This 
is literally the effect of 
falling off a cliff. (chap. 2) 
Small changes in locus of 
control from teacher to 
students may lead to 
significant changes in 
classroom learning. 
#2.  Deterministic rules of 
behavior give rise to 
completely predictable 
events. (p. 85) 
Chaos theory – the “Lorenz 
Butterfly Effect” where 
minute differences in initial 
conditions evolve quickly 
into vastly different states. 
(Chap. 3) 
Regardless of how concrete, 
straightforward, and 
simplistic direct instruction 
may be, learners often 
emerge with radically 
different understandings. 
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#3. All real-world truths are 
the logical outcome of 
following a set of rules. (p. 
115) 
Incomputability – Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem. 
The essence of this property 
is that “there’s always 
something out there in the 
real world that resists being 
fenced in by a deductive 
argument” (Chap. 4, p. 
150). 
Learning outcomes occur in 
classrooms that current 
theories of learning are 
unable to predict. 
# 4. Complicated systems 
can always be understood 
by breaking them down into 
simpler parts. 
Irreducibility – in complex 
systems, due to the nature 
of the connectivity between 
elements, trying to make 
sense of the system by 
breaking the connections 
irrevocably changes the 
nature of the system. (Chap. 
5) 
This is essentially 
Aristotle’s truism that the 
whole is more than the sum 
of the parts. Classroom 
learning is a function of the 
relations and 
interrelationships of all the 
members of the learning 
community. 
# 5. Surprising behavior 




organization – “surprising 
behavior can occur as a 
consequence of the 
Exciting learning outcomes 
can be achieved by 
encouraging learners to 
“self-organize,” that is, to 
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among a system’s 
component parts. 
interaction among simple 
parts” (Chap. 6, p. 230). 
direct and make sense of 
their own learning.  
 
In Casti’s “roots of surprise” we have the beginnings of an understanding of complexity 
as well as the beginnings of a rationale for thinking of classroom learning as a complex 
system.  
To summarize, John Casti (1994) does an excellent job of identifying the 
challenges in trying to understand experience from a systems-theoretical point of view. 
Systems that are complex have local instabilities and non-linearities that can result in 
catastrophic reorganizations, and they exhibit “deterministic chaos,” eventually settling in 
on a few “strange attractors” (p. 29; see Circle-10 System example, pp. 33-37) via chaotic 
and apparently random paths. Complex systems are ones in which logical rules do not 
necessarily lead to logical behaviors. They cannot be studied by breaking them into 
constituent parts because local and global connectivity are critical to the activity of the 
system. Finally, complex systems are ones in which unexpected patterns at one level can 
emerge from relatively simple interactions between agents at a lower level. 
When we undertake the business of trying to make sense of learning in 
classrooms and to look at the “big picture”–modeling classrooms as connected wholes 
rather than linear combinations of individual learners–new kinds of theoretical tools are 
called for. In Complexification Casti has paved the way for the application of complex 
systems analyses by pointing out that common-sense attempts at understanding systems 
are usually inadequate, and he has issued a challenge to theory-builders to embrace 
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complexity as a science on their way to the “more ambitious… program of creating a 
theory of models” (p. 278): 
…common usage of the term complex is informal. The word is typically 
employed as a name for something that seems counterintuitive, unpredictable, or 
just plain hard to pin down. So if it is a genuine science of complex systems we 
are after and not just anecdotal accounts based on vague personal opinions, we’re 
going to have to translate some of these informal notions about the complex and 
the commonplace into a more formal, stylized language, one in which intuition 
and meaning can be more or less faithfully captured in symbols and syntax. (p. 
270)  
This article will respond to Casti’s call for formalization and operationalization of 
terms and approaches in building complex systems analyses, first by discussing some 
Camazine, et al.’s (2001) work in the field of biology and then by taking a closer look at 
John Holland’s (1995) book Hidden Order.  
Camazine, et al.: Biological Systems 
The approach to a complexity-based theory of biological organization offered by 
Camazine, et al., (2001) may be very fruitful for assisting in our thinking about classroom 
learning in systems sorts of ways. In their book, Self-Organization in Biological Systems, 
these authors describe a wide variety of biological systems and assess the development of 
those systems in terms of possible “mechanisms of pattern formation” (p. 47) that could 
be seen as sources of observable organization. When trying to make sense of the complex 
behaviors of such systems, it is often beneficial to move to a higher-level vantage point 
and watch the behavioral patterns evolve from the context of a larger set of patterns and 
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behaviors. Alternatively, it is sometimes useful to slip down a level, and observe how the 
system you are trying to understand offers the context for a “lower” set of behaviors.  
For example, if one wants to think about the rules-set that might govern the flight 
characteristics of one of Conrad Parker’s and Craig Reynolds’ Java “boids” 
(http://www.vergenet.net/~conrad/boids/), one can raise his or her vantage point up to the 
level of the flock. From that position, one can focus one’s attention on an individual 
agent and watch the patterns of the flock as a whole, and use this combined perspective 
to inform attempts at modeling the rules-system of the boid. Similarly, if one is trying to 
understand the search behaviors of individual foraging ants, he or she could slip “down” 
a level, and focus on the local terrain and distributions of food sources. It is within this 
context that the ants’ activity patterns emerge–the “structure” of the ants’ surroundings 
exerts a strong influence on observed foraging patterns. 
Although Camazine et al. (2001) fail to provide an explicit definition for what 
they are calling a complex system, it is reasonable to suggest that they are thinking of 
(agent-based) systems in a fairly standard sense–systems composed of multiple agents 
acting according to a hypothesized collection of (internal) rules in co-operation with local 
information and other agents. Activity of the agents at the local level generates patterns at 
a more global level. These authors define pattern as a “particular, organized arrangement 
of objects in space or time” (p. 8), state that global patterns are seen to emerge from the 
organization of local activity, and propose various plausible mechanisms for their 
emergence. 
 In order to understand the activity of an organizing system, for example, of a 
classroom as it learns, careful attention should be paid to the types of things that appear 
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to drive or encourage the organization. Camazine et al. (2001) provide a list of potential 
activity organizers in biological systems: strong leaders, blueprints, recipes, templates, 
and self-organization. The first four of these impose organization from outside the 
system. The fifth, self-organization, has its genesis inside the system: “Pattern formation 
occurs through interactions internal to the system, without intervention by external 
directing influences” (p. 7). Beyond successfully responding to Casti’s call for 
formalization of systems-theoretical approaches, additional “cash value” (James, 
1975/1978, p. 32) of Camazine et al.’s systems perspective for the current purposes is 
obtained from the way that it highlights considerations of control of activity and locates 
that control internally or externally to the group and its constituents. 
Strong leaders, blueprints, recipes, and templates are all mechanisms for 
controlling activity that are viewed as being external to the system, organizing activity by 
remote control so to speak. Referring back to Casti (1994), note that systems analyses are 
“inherently subjective” (p. 269): what one ends up seeing in part depends upon which 
levels of organization one chooses to observe. In high school classrooms one may view 
students’ activity as always being driven externally, since, for example, school attendance 
(on the level of a “long” time frame) is mandatory for most students and periodic class 
changes (on the level of “short” time frames) powerfully regulate students’ experiences. 
Mandatory attendance or relocations notwithstanding, even when students are physically 
present, they usually direct their own attention, deciding  (more or less consciously) if, 
when, and how to engage in learning opportunities and other activities. This ambiguity–
are the students being externally controlled or are they directing their own activity–does 
not invalidate using systems perspectives as ways to study classroom learning. What it 
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does do is demonstrate the need of researchers to be careful about how they delimit, 
define, and communicate about the systems they are studying.  
For example, although it seems that much of what goes on at the level of 
classrooms in a school is actually driven by external controllers such as legislative 
mandates, “core curricula”, and bus schedules, it also seems like many of the more 
interesting aspects of learning will only come into focus when we (subjectively) choose 
to background exterior driving mechanisms and observe classrooms at a finer level of 
detail. At the level of small groups learning addition facts, whole groups learning about 
the Civil War, or individuals learning to read, we can begin to look for components of 
complex systems as defined in other fields of research. As students and groups of 
students self-organize, selectively negotiating and deciding which chunks of the 
curriculum to attend to and composing what they have attended to into useful models, it 
seems that powerful insights into learning (e.g., what is motivating students, what 
concepts are salient to the students, or how they use the models they have created) will 
become evident.  
Camazine et al. (2001) describe their notion of self-organization as being a 
function of the concerted activities of groups of self-directed agents within the system. 
The primary mechanism for the self-organization of groups of agents is feedback, another 
of the important “basic terms” that needs formalization in systems-theoretical 
perspectives. Positive and negative feedback are “the two basic modes of interaction 
among the components of self-organizing systems” (p. 15). Positive feedback “generally 
promotes changes in a system” taking “an initial change in a system and [reinforcing] that 
change in the same direction as the initial deviation” (p. 17). Negative feedback is the 
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mechanism by which the “amplifying nature of positive feedback” (p. 19) is moderated. 
Negative feedback reacts to changes in the system, triggering an “opposing response that 
counteracts the perturbation” (p. 16). In these authors’ approach to understanding 
systems, “self-enhancing positive feedback coupled with antagonistic negative feedback 
[provide] powerful [mechanisms for] creating structure and pattern” (p. 20), keeping the 
system dynamically dancing along the fine edge between chaos and stability. 
In addition to feedback, Camazine et al. (2001) characterize self-organizing 
systems as being dynamic, requiring “continual interactions among lower-level 
components to produce and maintain structure” (p. 29). Closely related to their 
dynamism, self-organizing systems are said to be emergent, where emergence is seen as a 
“process by which a system of interacting subunits acquires qualitatively new properties 
that cannot be understood as the simple addition of their individual contributions” (p. 31). 
Evolution in time in combination with nonlinear interactions between the agents of the 
system result in the emergence of complex global patterns that do not exist at the local 
level. 
Camazine et al. (2001) have contributed significantly to the sort of challenge that 
John Casti (1994) has identified—their seminal work on self-organization has clearly 
defined terms of interest and types of organization and has helped to clarify their 
meanings via extensive examples of biological systems. For them, the focus is on self-
organization and the mechanisms that bring it about. Following their lead, a researcher 
would turn his or her attention to the dynamic activity of the agents in a system and look 
for the mechanisms of positive and negative feedback that cause complex activity 
patterns to emerge. Camazine et al.’s is an example of a useful and informative, 
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formalized, application of systems-theoretical perspectives in service of understanding 
the behavior of real-world phenomena. Now let us turn our attention to another 
noteworthy example of the effort to formalize tools and analytical perspectives on the 
study of complex systems. 
John Holland: Complex Adaptive Systems 
Perhaps the most promising and fruitful discussion of complex systems for 
theory-building about classroom learning is John Holland’s 1995 book, Hidden Order. In 
this work, Holland takes on the task of attempting to lay out and define a more-or-less 
universal and prototypical complex adaptive system. He conjectures that it is possible to 
identify a set of attributes that all complex adaptive systems (CAS)3  (pp. 6-10) can be 
seen to possess. Later in first chapter Holland describes CAS as being primarily 
characterized by the presence of agents, meta-agents, and adaptation and says that these 
can be understood and studied in terms of “seven basics,” a set of four “properties” 
(aggregation, nonlinearity, flows, and diversity) and a set three “mechanisms" (tagging, 
internal models, and building blocks). These features, adaptation, agents (that can be seen 
as aggregating into meta-agents), and the mechanisms and properties serve two 
fundamental purposes. First, they can be used in deciding whether or not a system under 
study can indeed be thought of as a CAS, and second, the features, mechanisms, and 
properties provide analytical tools for investigating the nature of that system.  
First of all, Holland (1995) sets out the notions of “agents” and “meta-agents” as 
being present in all CAS and requisite for categorizing a system as such. The “active 
elements” that are “diverse in both form and capability” (p. 6) are seen to act, to behave, 
as if they were responding to an internal set of rules. He is quick to point out that these 
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hypothesized rule sets are not necessarily the rules that govern the behavior of the agents, 
or that rule sets are actually what governs the agents’ behavior. Instead, thinking of the 
agents as rules-driven in this way provides “ a convenient way to describe agent 
strategies” (p. 8). Next, Holland demonstrates a common strategy employed in systems 
analyses by bumping up a level and describing “meta-agents” as a way of thinking about 
“what CAS do” (p. 11)–meta-agents are higher-level agents whose complex behavior 
patterns are actually aggregated combinations of the behaviors of the less complex agents 
a level down in the hierarchy. In the same way meta-agents can be aggregated into “meta-
meta-agents,” thus creating “the hierarchical organization so typical of CAS” (p. 9). To 
summarize, CAS are composed of active elements (in classrooms, these could be 
individual students or groups of students) that behave as if responding to an internal set 
of rules, and their behaviors at the local level combine to create informative patterns of 
activity at subsequent meta-levels. Those meta-levels can again be thought of as 
(aggregated) agents operating at still higher levels of assimilation 
Adaptation, “the sine qua non of CAS” (Holland, 1995, p. 8), is, at least for the 
purposes of this article, learning. Adaptation is a feature of all CAS and Holland often 
resorts to biological metaphors to characterize this attribute. He says that adaptation is 
how the “organism fits itself to its environment” and “experience guides changes in the 
organism’s structure… [in order to] make better use of its environment for its own ends” 
(p. 9). If agents behave as if they were responding to an internal set of rules or a 
particular internal model, then a way for them to learn is by modifying those rules or that 
model in response to experience. Rules can thus be viewed as “hypotheses that are 
undergoing testing and confirmation” (p. 53) and internal models as dynamic 
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representations of the organism’s environment. Holland’s treatment goes into significant 
detail about how the transformation of rules and models might proceed, but it is sufficient 
for the present purpose to say that the process is recursive, based on information 
(feedback) from the environment that the agent is immersed in and selectively attends to, 
and results in the formulation of new and improved rules sets. 
One other component of Holland’s (1995) view of adaptation needs mentioning 
because it sheds light on the ways in which patterns emerge from the activity of 
individual agents. Each agent’s environment is partly composed of other agents, “so that 
a portion of any agent’s efforts at adaptation is spent adapting to other adaptive agents. 
This one feature is a major source of the temporal patterns that CAS generate” (p. 10). 
The agents of a complex adaptive system are constantly adapting to their environment, 
and that environment includes other adapting agents, the net effect being the evolution of 
complex patterns of activity when viewed from “one level up”. At this point the notion of 
adaptation is probably sufficiently defined for the purposes of this essay: adaptation can 
be viewed as learning based upon emergent interactions that an agent has with its 
environment, a major component of that environment is other adaptive agents, and the 
patterns of activity generated by agents’ individual and mutual adaptation provide the 
observable organizational characteristics of CAS. 
It is important to note, for the purposes of constructing connections to prior 
theories in the field of educational research (Piaget’s in particular), that Holland relies 
very heavily on “genetic algorithms” (p. 69) and molecular biology to build his theory of 
the mechanisms of adaptation in CAS. At the same time, lest the readers think that 
Holland’s work is solely biological, it should be noted that he also applies his adaptation 
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schemes to the (iterated) Prisoner’s Dilemma as well as economics (pp. 80-87) and many 
other diverse systems. It is also important to note that as agents and their behaviors 
evolve, so does their environment. Although Holland does not discuss this explicitly, the 
idea that agents and their environs can be seen as mutually adaptive provides an 
additional and potentially useful piece to the puzzle of CAS. The patterns of activity and 
adaptation of the agents in a CAS are influenced by and influence the environment, and 
so it seems that watching the evolution of the surroundings as well as the evolution of the 
agents should also enhance understandings about CAS. This article proceeds with a brief 
examination of the mechanisms and properties that make up the foundations of John 
Holland’s theory of complex adaptive systems. 
The Seven Basics: Mechanisms and Properties 
 These “seven basics” that Holland (1995) considers common characteristics of all 
CAS “are not the only basics that could be selected” (p. 10) as ways of understanding the 
activity of complex adaptive systems.  He reminds us that, as researchers, we still need to 
be a bit artful, choosing which characteristics will provide useful foci for our particular 
investigations. “This is not so much a matter of correct or incorrect… as it is a matter of 
what questions are being investigated” (p. 8). At the same time, Holland’s work is 
intended to generate a model that can be used for studying all CAS and he claims that 
“all the other candidates” for mechanisms and properties that he has encountered can be 
“derived” from “combinations of these seven” (p. 10). This is a strong claim, and one that 
will need ongoing reflection and testing, but for now, let us accept these seven basics as 
sufficiently characterizing all CAS and take a closer look at them in hopes of developing 
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a general understanding of their applicability for building useful understandings of 
complex adaptive systems4. 
Aggregation. 
This attribute has two interpretations that are applicable to CAS. First, the simpler 
sense of this term has to do with the natural process of building categories, and this 
activity is a fundamental method for building models. It is what we do as model builders. 
We chose which aspects of a system to aggregate in order to simplify the complexity–this 
is one of those “artful” activities that helps us to make sense of the world. So in studying 
a system, or thinking about our worlds, we very naturally create inclusive categories such 
as cars or trucks or “gifted” learners. A subtlety that figures later into the conversation 
about “building blocks” is the idea that the categories we create are “reusable [emphasis 
added]; we almost always decompose novel scenes into familiar categories” (Holland, 
1995, pp. 10-11). Aggregation in this (simpler) sense speaks to the categorization of 
components of CAS that are chosen for the purposes of highlighting certain features and 
backgrounding others in service of a particular investigation or model. 
 The second sense of the term aggregate is the one mentioned in the foregoing 
introduction to Holland’s approach. This sense of the term refers to the coalescence of 
individual agents at one level of complexity into “meta-agents” at the next higher 
organizational level, and is a fundamental property of all CAS. Careful study of this type 
of aggregation is one of the primary means by which we can make sense of these systems 
and this complex systems approach. Holland poses several questions germane to this type 
of aggregation:  
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What kind of “boundaries” demarcate these adaptive aggregates? How are the 
agent interactions within these boundaries directed and coordinated? How do the 
contained interactions generate behaviors that transcend the behaviors of the 
component elements? We must be able to answer such questions if we are to 
resolve the mysteries… (p. 12) 
These questions point at means by which we can begin to use elements of CAS analysis 
for the purposes of furthering understanding of particular systems. In the case of 
classroom learning for instance, what will be the composition of spontaneously forming 
“small groups” in a given classroom, and how will those aggregates evolve over different 
time scales? On what basis, what sets of rules, will these groups form? What are the 
effects of these small group formations on learning at the individual, small group and 
whole class levels? One possible means for investigating these questions is the first item 
on Holland’s list of seven basics–tagging–and it is to this mechanism that our attention 
will now turn. 
Tagging. 
 This is one of the mechanisms of CAS that enables adaptation and promotes the 
formation of aggregates. Tagging is a process of identifying features in the environment 
of a CAS that become salient and useful in determining its future activity. A CAS selects 
salient features (building blocks) from all the possible inputs in its environment as a 
function of a currently active set of tagging rules and these rules structure agents’ parsing 
their environments by motivating and driving selective attention. When a CAS first 
encounters a situation, a preexisting set of tagging rules relevant to the particular situation 
becomes active, and the rules specify particular things for the CAS to expect, and to look 
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for. “Well-established tag-based interactions provide a sound basis for filtering, 
specialization, and cooperation” (pp. 14-15), and these activities in turn lead “to the 
emergence of meta-agents and organizations” (p. 15). It is important to note that tagging 
rules sets are themselves persistent internal models (“schemata,” p. 90) that are composed 
of building blocks derived from useful tagging strategies and model building in earlier 
experiences. The notion of “tagging” as a mechanism for aggregation and adaptation is a 
powerful affordance of systems-theoretic approaches for understanding classroom 
learning, and it can help provide useful answers to the lists of education- and learning-
based questions posed above.  
Nonlinearity. 
 Holland’s (1995) definition of this property of all CAS is equivalent to its 
common usage in mathematics. Simply put, it states that the behavior of the whole cannot 
be understood by a simple additive combination of the parts. This important property is 
another of the things that make CAS complex. Multiple considerations figure into the 
activities of the agents in a system, and depending on local spatial and temporal 
conditions various “weight functions” associated with various rules combine to produce 
decisions of the moment. As it turns out, relatively few of the truly interesting things in 
life can be accurately mathematized using strictly linear functions–as Holland puts it, “To 
attempt to study cas with [linear] techniques is much like trying to play chess by 
collecting statistics on the way pieces move” (pp. 15-16). Complex systems simply 
cannot be accurately described using linear mathematics. One important implication of 
using a complex systems approach to understanding classroom learning, and learning in 
general, is just this point. That is, a complexity-based view of learning will be focused on 
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the non-linear properties of the system, and their presence makes the use of simple 
averaging techniques (e.g., “bell curves”) unreliable and outright inadmissible methods 
for complex systems analyses. Current efforts to measure the effectiveness of teachers by 
looking at the aggregated scores of their students on high-stakes assessments are 
questionable in light of the non-linearities inherent in the CAS called classroom learning. 
Flows. 
 Understanding of this property of complex adaptive systems is facilitated by 
thinking of CAS as networks of nodes and connectors. The nodes might be small towns 
and local roads the connectors that enable the flows of goods and services.  Tags play an 
important part in the development and evolution of flows–because the “adaptive 
processes that modify CAS [flows] select for tags that mediate useful interactions and 
against tags that cause malfunctions” (Holland, 1995, p. 23). Flows are observables that 
evolve, coming and going in space and time and as such they provide insights into the 
workings of a CAS as it adapts. There are two important properties of flows, multiplier 
and recycler effects. The multiplier effect relates to the situation where resources are 
“injected” at a node, and the recycler effect speaks to the situation where the “stuff” of 
flows is returned to the network (p. 23). Both of these effects are in the category of 
“positive feedback” and are potent sources of nonlinearities. Examples of things that 
“flow” as classrooms learn might be information, control over time, or material and 
equipment resource allocations. Flows are another property that can provide information 
about and enable developing understandings of complex adaptive systems. 
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Diversity. 
 Another property of Holland’s CAS, diversity plays a fairly complicated role in 
their makeup. To understand diversity, one needs to think about the “niches” that agents 
may fill, in, for example, a biological ecology and to think about how those niches might 
evolve over time. “Each kind of agent fills a niche that is defined by the interactions 
centering on that agent. If we remove one kind of agent from the system, creating a 
‘hole’, the system typically responds with a cascade of adaptations resulting in a new 
agent that ‘fills the hole’” (Holland, 1995, p. 27). The property of diversity is a major 
factor in the evolution of an ecology when, for example, an agent moves into totally new 
territory or when an agent is successful in generating a new niche. Diversity is a 
“dynamic pattern, often persistent and coherent like a standing wave” (p. 29), but it is 
actually more dynamic than a standing wave, because the diversity property itself evolves 
as a function of adaptations, opening the “possibility for further interactions and new 
niches” (p. 29).   
Here we can really see the method in Holland’s ordering of these properties and 
mechanisms–diversity depends in a non-linear way on flows, and in return, as niches 
open and close, diversity alters the flows in the CAS. Tagging is a major determinant of 
what flows and how it flows. Evolution of flows occurs in very non-linear ways, and the 
whole process constitutes and is constituted by adaptation. Perhaps the readers will agree 
that what is being built here is a cogent, cohesive, and inclusive model for thinking about, 
talking about, and investigating the nature and evolution of complex systems such as 
classroom communities of learners. 
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Internal Models. 
 The mechanism of internal models plays a vital role in the activities of CAS. 
Internal models are the mechanism by which CAS anticipate, and it is through 
anticipation and prediction that agents adapt to and thrive in their environments. 
Although the mechanism of internal model building seems much more applicable to 
sentient systems than to all CAS, Holland (1995) makes the case that even bacteria 
implicitly predict the presence of food (i.e., build an internal model) when they follow 
chemical gradients (p. 32). It is important for Holland’s work in developing a universal 
model of CAS that he be able to identify a way that prediction and anticipation work at 
(essentially) all levels of CAS analysis (thus including lower life forms), but educators 
and educational researchers do not share that constraint. In human learning in general, 
and in classroom learning in particular, the notions of anticipation and prediction based 
on internal models are not at all difficult to defend.  
 According to Holland (1995), the “critical characteristic” of a model is that it 
enables the agent to “infer something about the thing being modeled” (p. 33). Internal 
models are created by an agent’s selectively attending to building blocks in its 
environment and then using this information for the purposes of creating and refining its 
internal structure, its models. The models are then employed as predictors, elements 
internal to the agent that enable it to respond to and benefit from the local environment. 
Models “actively determine the agent’s behavior” (p. 34). They are “subject to selection 
and progressive adaptation” based on new information, and we start to see the possibility 
of iterative adaptational loops, based solely on individual agents and local conditions, that 
can provide powerful insights into the learning and adaptation patterns of higher-level 
27 
CAS (meta-agents). In a classroom example, learners may create and refine their internal 
knowledge structures as a function of interactions with their environment, and at the same 
time, the meta-agent, the classroom, may change its nature in a related manner.  
Building Blocks. 
 The last of Holland’s seven basic ingredients of complex adaptive systems is 
closely related to the mechanism of internal models. This mechanism provides a means 
for generating useful internal models of a “perpetually novel environment” (Holland, 
1995, p. 34) by the distillation from experience of reusable “building blocks.” Agents 
create building blocks through a process of selective attention–decomposing information 
from their environment into constituent elements that can be combined and re-combined 
into internal models. Through iterative use and testing agents accumulate building blocks 
that enable the construction of useful internal models, models that enable those agents to 
anticipate the probabilities and consequences of potential actions. Iterated and mutually 
influential development of building blocks and internal models is a key source of the 
adaptation of complex adaptive systems. 
Summary  
 John Holland’s (1995) treatment of the fundamentals of complex adaptive 
systems is a detailed and comprehensive systems-theoretical framework. It actually 
provides a well-defined “litmus test” for deciding whether or not to consider a system as 
complex and adaptive and for defending such a decision. Beyond that, it provides 
powerful conceptual tools, the properties and mechanisms, for analyzing the activity and 
pattern development of CAS.  
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 This extended discussion of Holland’s model of generalized complex adaptive 
systems is intended to provide a subsequent framework for building arguments that 
classroom learning and human learning in general can be profitably studied from a 
systems-theoretical point of view. That project might proceed by first drawing parallels 
between observed patterns of behaviors, mechanisms, and properties in classrooms, and 
then using those parallels to generate a model of learning based on the systems approach. 
Although a thorough treatment of classroom learning as CAS is beyond the intended 
scope of this article, a plan will be sketched out for how one might proceed toward doing 
that in a later section.  
Each of these three perspectives on dynamical systems, Camazine, et al.’s (2001), 
Casti’s (1994), and Holland’s (1995), provides an ontological pathway for making sense 
of complex systems and of the collective behavior of aggregates of agents. These 
perspectives also serve to define and clarify the types of considerations necessary in 
undertaking a complex systems analysis. The next section of this article will turn to a 
discussion of the utility of these perspectives for understanding the complicated activities 
inherent in classroom learning. 
Individualized and Systems Approaches to Learning 
The great majority of theory building in constructivist and cognitivist learning 
theories has been focused on the learning of an individual. Behaviorist perspectives 
(Skinner, 1954; Stein, Silbert, & Carnine, 1997), information processing perspectives 
(Anderson, 1983; Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 2000; Mayer, 1996), novice-expert 
perspectives (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; NRC, 1999, chap. 2; Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & 
Resnick, 2000), schema-theoretic perspectives (Derry, 1996; diSessa, 1993), and 
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constructivist perspectives (Cobb, 1994; Ernest, 1996; Piaget5, 1923/1959, 
1924/1969,1929/1951; Vygotsky, 1987, chap. 6) are all predominantly individualistic 
views of  learning. These efforts have provided many insights and have been very 
successful in helping researchers to build useful models of learning. Although 
individualistic approaches to learning have been quite productive they also have several 
limitations.  
Limitations of Individualistic Theories of Learning 
The first limitation of individualistic theories of learning is that they do not 
“scale” well–that is, the learning of a classroom of students is not very profitably 
described as the linear combination of a number of individual learners. This type of 
scaling to whole classrooms of learners does not and cannot take into account the 
complex interactions and synergetic effects derived from the properties of groups. Very 
little of what goes on in classrooms can be understood in terms of straightforward cause 
and effect relationships and simple aggregations of individual learners. 
Individualized models of learning tend to be more static than dynamic. 
Behavioristic models (e.g., Stein, Silbert, & Carnine, 1997, pp. 3-29) assume that 
learning is the simple accumulation of fixed and appropriately sized knowledge bits that 
are taken in as given, without any active adaptation or interpretation on the part of the 
learner. In another line of (individualized) learning research, learners are posited to 
possess relatively static conceptual structures and then teaching and learning are thought 
of as constructing knowledge structures and then repairing or replacing “misconceptions” 
(Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & Resnick, 2000, p. 7) with increasingly “expert” structures, though 
little is said in the literature about how these transformations actually take place. Even 
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Andrea diSessa’s schemas of phenomenological primitives (diSessa, 1993, p. 111) may 
be viewed as static structures that learners access information from for the purposes of 
making sense of the world around them. In each of these lines of research, knowledge is 
envisioned as bits of information stored in and accessed from static conceptual structures 
internal to individual “knowers”. 
Individualized approaches also tend to focus on a learner at the expense of the 
learner’s context and her or his membership in a learning community. There are many 
aspects of the surrounding contextual situation that influence how learning takes place 
and what gets learned (Lave, 1988; Lave &Wenger, 1991; Wertsch, del Rio, & Alvarez, 
1995). Students and teachers are embedded in a wide variety of social, historical, and 
cultural systems (cf., Bowers, Cobb, & McClain, 1999; Hiebert, et al., 1996, p. 19; Lave 
& Wenger, 1991, pp. 67-69) that profoundly affect learning (Cobb, Perlwitz, & 
Underwood, 1996) and individualized approaches to learning generally overlook these 
important and complex influences. The sociocultural historical milieu of the classroom 
can be seen as the environment relative to which adaptation occurs. At any given 
moment, classrooms and learners are immersed in a wide variety of interconnected and 
often competing activities and goals structures. Theories of learning that focus on 
individuals generally do not take these kinds of complex and ubiquitous learning 
conditions into account. 
Finally, individualized accounts of learning do not offer very much to teachers in 
the way of helping them to make sense of or design for whole-classroom activities. 
Although teachers may develop individualized educational plans, they almost never 
design classroom activities with a single individual in mind. Classroom activity is 
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inherently group activity, and there is very little in the language and ideas of 
individualized cognitively-based or even constructivism-based learning theory that 
enables teachers to make sense of the activities of groups of learners. 
Affordances of Systems-theoretic Approaches to Learning 
In contrast to individualized approaches, dynamical systems-theoretical 
perspectives have much to offer in terms of helping teachers, researchers, and others to 
focus on and make sense of learning at the level of the group. First, a systems perspective 
enables thinking about classroom learning in terms of a dynamic, continuously changing 
“dance” between the group, its members, and the contextual situation. Second, as 
discussed above, classrooms are much more than a linear sum of individual learners, and 
a systems perspective enables thinking about the synergetic affordances and “lever 
points” (Holland, 1995, p. 39) inherent in classrooms. Third, it may well be that the most 
important affordance of systems-theoretical approaches to learning is in the language of 
complexity itself.  
Very recently, complex systems terminology and the ideas that that terminology 
represents have increasingly been finding their way into the discussions and literature of 
cognitivist, constructivist, and sociocultural learning theory camps. It seems that the use 
of the language of complexity is preceding more rigorous and careful application of 
systems-theoretical tenets–Casti’s (1994) “formalization” (pp. 274-276)–to perspectives 
on learning. The hope is that use of the language will serve as precursor and enabler of 
more systematic complexity-based modeling in future education research. In any event, 
the combination of the fundamental ability to address dynamism and complex 
interrelations, the ability to provide a powerfully descriptive language for talking about 
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what happens in classrooms and larger contexts, and the potential for formalization of 
these things into useful models all serve to demonstrate the potential of systems-
theoretical approaches for research into learning. 
Systems perspectives do scale well in terms of considerations of group activity. In 
one way or another, every dynamical systems viewpoint addresses both the individual 
and the aggregate. For example, from the structuralist perspective of Jean Piaget6 
(1968/1970, chap. 2), the group and the elements of the group are mutually constitutive. 
That is, the dynamic creation of a group, the activity of individual members of the group, 
and the group’s context each influence the other, forming a complex adaptive system. An 
example of this in a classroom is when students are aware (or quickly become aware) of 
their status within the larger group, and those status considerations have powerful effects 
on the students’ and the group’s subsequent activities (cf. Empson, 2003). Complex 
systems analyses (Casti, 1994; Camazine, et al., 2001; Clark, 1997; Holland, 1995, 1998; 
Stroup & Wilensky, 2000; Prigogine, 1984, 1997) focus on higher-level patterns (e.g., 
aggregation, flows) that are generated by activity and adaptation at the level of 
individuals whose behaviors are based solely on the local environment and the 
individual’s own internal models. In contrast to individualized theories of learning, 
systems-theoretical points of view are fundamentally concerned with viewing learners 
and groups as mutually constitutive agents whose behavior is to be understood in the 
context of their larger patterns of activity. 
Systems-theoretical points of view tend to be very dynamic–characterizing 
activity in terms of evolving patterns as opposed to looking at activity captured in static 
“snapshots”. A clear-cut and visual example of this can be seen in Conrad Parker and 
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Craig Reynolds’ model of the flocking behavior of birds 
(http://heidi.vergenet.net/~conrad/boids/). Here the observer is virtually compelled to 
build an understanding of the “boids’” that is fundamentally dynamic. The back-and-
forth, up-and-down, landing-and-taking-flight behavior of real birds is quintessentially 
captured by the dynamical nature of the modeling. The same will be true of dynamical 
representations of classroom learning. It will be the patterns of activity that become the 
focus of understandings that develop. Rather than static “snapshots” of individual 
students’ learning, such as quiz grades or end-of-year tests, assessments of learning will 
be made in real-time, and in context. For example, in the NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) 
HubNet ‘Function Activity’, students’ moving toward or away from the targeted locus of 
points on a line provide learners and instructors with immediate feedback. Learners and 
teachers can see, assess, and adapt moment by moment—thus understanding the current 
states of the learners’ and learner’s progress and proactively modifying those states 
become integral aspects of ongoing classroom activity. The dynamic character of a 
systems-theoretic view of learning provides grounding, tools, and a framework for 
thinking about the patterns of evolution, development, and adaptation of learners and 
learning. 
 Complexity and complex interactions are what characterize classrooms and 
classroom learning. Students’ goals and teachers’ goals are frequently different and often 
at odds. Classroom participants’ social, economic, cultural, and historical backgrounds 
are becoming increasingly diverse and sometimes adversarial (Fordham & Ogbu, 1986; 
Ogbu, 1990). Classroom structures may require behavior that is antithetical to expected 
behaviors in students’ non-school lives. Classroom learning is situated and directed by 
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the contexts of the school, the district, and local, state, and federal mandates, norms, and 
expectations. All of these factors and many others combine to create a dazzlingly 
complex context for situating learning, and systems-theoretical approaches provide 
unique advantages for dealing with complex contexts.  
 Systems theoretical approaches can “see” complex relations and accommodate 
their effects. The possibility of multiple “attractors” (Casti, 1994, pp. 28-29) within a 
limited region is taken as a given in CAS approaches. As an example from the classroom, 
consider the conflicting student goals of wanting to perform well on a test and not 
wanting to upstage one’s peers, or for a teacher, wanting all of one’s students to pass first 
year algebra but not feeling capable of handling large class sizes in second year algebra. 
Systems approaches attend to the existence of multiple driving forces and have 
mechanisms for dealing with the concomitant positive and negative feedback effects on 
the behaviors of the system.  
 Systems perspectives encourage a reflexive and reflective shifting of levels, from 
considerations of the individual’s perspective to a focus on the patterns of the aggregate 
and back again. Individuals make personal decisions based upon their own “rules sets” 
and their immediate situation. The synergetic sum of individuals’ decisions gives rise to 
the patterning of the activity at the group level. A further shift in levels, say from the 
classroom to the school, might facilitate decision making about curricula and policies. A 
systems perspective enables multiple levels of focus for the purposes of understanding 
and making sense of learning.  
In addition to the above, systems-theoretical approaches offer a subtler and 
perhaps much more important benefit. They give researchers, teachers, and learners a 
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consistent language with which to talk about classroom learning. The terminology of 
complexity theory is finding its way into educational discourse at nearly every level.  
From state-of-the-art researchers to curriculum designers to classroom teachers people 
are beginning to employ systems ideas in many arenas. This appropriation of the 
language and the common-sense ideas of complexity by inquirers into learning may be 
the most compelling argument of all for the utility of the approach. Thinking about 
groups of learners and the consequences of nonlinearities in learning becomes much more 
likely and productive as educators appropriate the language of complexity. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 The implications of systems-theoretical perspectives for research into learning 
remain largely unexplored, and at best what follows are but a few of the possibilities 
suggested by the foregoing discussions of the work of John Casti (1994), Camazine, et al. 
(2001), and John Holland (1995).  
 From Casti’s (1994) perspective, there is a research opportunity in terms of 
arguing for a definitive demonstration that classrooms and classroom learning can indeed 
be thought of as “complex” (p. 269) systems. Although the idea of classrooms as being 
complex systems is apparently being taken as a given by the education research 
community at large, an effort to identify the characteristics that Casti describes as the 
“stuff of complexity,” such as catastrophic changes, irreducibility, and emergence in real-
life classroom activity would be very important. It seems that one of the first steps toward 
Casti’s sort of formalization of a systems approach to classroom learning should be a 
careful characterization of the range and types of complexification that occur in 
classrooms. Identification and exemplification of Casti’s five sources of surprise (chaps. 
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2-6) as portrayed in actual classroom videotape footage accompanied by careful analysis 
of the nonlinearities and the sources thereof would constitute a valuable contribution to 
research on learning. 
 The systems perspective developed by Camazine, et al. (2001) offers another 
possibility for research directed at classroom learning. These authors offer five possible 
mechanisms of control of the activities of organized systems: strong leaders, blueprints, 
recipes, templates, and self-organization. The idea is that the activity of aggregates of 
agents (systems) can be directed externally (through the first four mechanisms listed) or 
internally through the process of self-organization, in which the activities of individual 
agents acting on their own accord based on local information combine to form complex 
patterns and structures (e.g., termite mounds and beehives). In relation to classroom 
learning, one can view any of these five “organizers” as the driving force behind 
particular classroom episodes. The line of possible research might be descriptive, much 
like the above proposal based on Casti’s work, trying to identify and capture episodes of 
activity where each of the five organizers is the dominant source of patterns of activity. 
Beyond this type of descriptive analysis, and once substantial patterns of organization 
and organizers have been established, research into the relative value of each for given 
learning outcomes might be pursued. For example, it may be that direction from a “strong 
leader” would prove to be most productive for acquisition of behaviorist-type learning 
goals such as rote memorization while self-organized learning opportunities might be 
shown to be more effective for developing higher-level thinking and problem-solving 
capabilities. 
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The perspective that seems to have the most potential for development of a 
systems-theoretical model of learning is John Holland’s (1995). Holland has tried to 
develop a model of a “universal” complex adaptive system. It is his contention that every 
CAS is composed of agents that aggregate into meta-agents and “learn” by adaptation. 
Beyond these fundamental attributes, he sees three mechanisms (tagging, building blocks, 
and internal models) and four properties (non-linearity, diversity, flows, and aggregation) 
as delineating a framework from which to make sense of CAS. Holland’s careful analysis 
and informative examples provide potentially powerful grounding for the projects of: 1) 
describing classroom learning and individual learning as CAS and, much like the 
proposal above based on Casti’s work, ultimately defining such learning as complex; and 
possibly, 2) extending and using such an analysis in order to explain, predict, orchestrate, 
and assess learning in classroom situations.  
Certainly each of these suggestions for research is tentative. The point here has 
been to begin a discussion and to lay out some ways that systems perspectives might be 
used for investigations into learning at several scales from individuals to groups. It is safe 
to say that human learning is not well described by simple models, linear relations, and 
static snapshots. This review hopefully represents the beginnings of an extensive and 
fruitful investigation into learning based on systems theories, self-organization, and, as 
Casti (1994) puts it, a “science of surprise”. 
CONCLUSION 
Since before recorded history humankind has been trying to make sense of a very 
complicated and complex world. We seek patterns that serve to simplify and distill 
experience and enable us to deal with complexity and survive, even flourish. Simplistic 
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modeling, approximation with linear relations, and dissection of big problems into small, 
solvable sub-problems have enabled significant progress and provided good “first order” 
results. Getting at the second, third, and higher order solutions requires accounting for 
more complex interrelationships and fabrication of subtler models. The evolution of 
systems-theoretical perspectives and modeling has paralleled and supported our quest for 
increasingly fine-tuned understandings. As the mathematics and the tools for computation 
have become more and more powerful, so have our models. Aristotle saw that the whole 
was usually greater than the sum of its parts, but it has taken quite a while to develop that 
observation into something more, something that we could use. From Piaget’s 
(1968/1970) notions of an algebraic group, to Bertalanffy and general systems theories, to 
self-organizing biological systems and a generalized “complex adaptive system” 
(Holland, 1995), we have made a tremendous amount of progress in recent times. We 
may be witnessing a large-scale paradigmatic shift (Kuhn, 1962) in our worldview where 
systems perspectives that embrace complexity will supplant linear perspectives that do 
not. 
Bertalanffy (1968) and Forrester (1968) established a general theory of systems. 
John Casti (1994) compellingly demonstrates that surprising results can emerge from 
even very simple systems and that our old truisms likely will not be adequate for building 
higher order models for understanding. Camazine et al. (2001) are deeply involved in 
building just the sort of “science of surprise” that Casti is lobbying for by closely 
considering how global patterns of organization emerge. John Holland (1995) is 
extending the complexity science still further building a "big idea" that captures the 
general features of all complex adaptive systems and gives us tools for making sense of 
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them. As systems theories become more evolved and more robust, it is only natural that 
their range of application will increase. 
The time has arrived, and the tools are at hand, for educational researchers to begin 
to build models that embrace the complexity of learning in ways that have not been 
possible before.  We are prepared to move beyond models of learning that reduce it to the 
pairing of stimulus with response or to a static collection of “data bits” and snapshots of 
student learning. Systems-theoretical perspectives on learning are providing us with the 
tools to make that move. The first steps will be necessarily small—we are just beginning 
to talk amongst ourselves about “emergent learning” and “synergetic effects” in groups of 
learners, but the movement is growing and applications are being honed. As the common 
use of the language of complexity moves toward formalism, the model building will 
become more powerful. That is really what writing this article has been about–an attempt 
to push understandings beyond vague ideas and imprecise meanings toward something 
approaching, if only roughly, a formalism. 
END NOTES 
1 URLs for these facilities can be found in the References section. 
2 Here, “classroom learning” is taken as an emergent conception whose meaning is 
evolving in relation to developing understandings of learning, systems, and real-life 
classroom experiences. Rather than leaving such an important term undefined, and with 
the foregoing caveat, let me say that I think of “classroom learning” in much the same 
way that I understand Lave and Wenger’s (1991) “communities of… practice” (p. 29) 
combined with moving toward “full participation” (pp. 36-37). That is, I view classroom 
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learning as a community of learners approaching full participation in larger communities, 
such as the science or mathematics disciplinary “communities.” 
3 Although Dr. Holland uses the lowercase ‘cas’ as an acronym for complex adaptive 
systems, this paper uses the uppercase CAS throughout. 
4 Holland discusses the seven basics not according to whether they are mechanisms or 
properties of CAS, but rather in a manner that emphasizes their interrelationships, and 
that order will be maintained here, for the same reason. 
5 Although there is controversy over whether or not Piaget was actually an individual-
constructivist most of the work done in the Piagetian tradition is decidedly focused on 
individuals. 
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Casual observations of the activity of students engaged in participatory 
simulations (Wilensky & Stroup, 1999) appear quite chaotic—two-dozen people all 
pushing buttons and making moves more or less simultaneously and at will. In the midst 
of this apparent chaos, there is a measure of the group’s simulation activity that is 
remarkably organized. A trademark of complex systems is that they experience 
apparently chaotic fluctuations in the course of their evolution. We say apparently chaotic 
because those same fluctuations, when viewed from a different perspective demonstrate a 
fairly startling regularity. In previous work, Thomas Hills and co-researchers (Hills, 
Hurford, Stroup, & Lesh, 2007) found scale-invariant behaviors in students’ participation 
in complex-systems simulations and discussed how particular patterns of behavior 
correlated with success in the simulation. We found Zipf-like (Zipf, 1949) scale-invariant 
behaviors (Adamic, n.d.) in the activity of individuals, classrooms, and aggregations of 
classrooms.  
The current article reports on replication and extension of the previous work and 
concludes by demonstrating that the same scale-invariant behaviors can be found in three 
different types of “participatory simulations” (Wilensky & Stroup, 1999). Furthermore, 
argue for notions of optimization as potentially informative ways of thinking about the 
emergence of scale-invariance in learning situations.  
Design-based research (DBR) in education and the learning sciences has two 
fundamental goals—development of theoretical knowledge and generation of educative 
learning activities. The data provided here were obtained in an early iteration of a DBR-
program that aims to build theory related to learning as a complex system and to design 
effective learning environments for learning and teaching about complex systems. A 
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report on the activity-development component of the current work can be found 
elsewhere (Hurford, in preparation). In the present article, we report on the theory-
building component of our design research experiment. We assume that classroom 
activity in general and learning in particular and can be viewed as complex systems and 
we report empirical data that supports our assumption. 
Complexity and Learning 
Complex systems are ubiquitous in many fields of study and multiple disciplines 
have benefited from the adoption of complexity-based models, metaphors, and theories. 
While “complex systems” predictably, means different things in different fields, there are 
some characteristics that can be reasonably expected in most complexity approaches. 
First, there should be multiple agents, dynamic activity, aggregation, and adaptation. The 
agents should be autonomous, and their activity should be “self-organized” (Camazine, et 
al., 2003, p. 8). That is, patterns of behavior observed at a level up (Casti, 1994, pp. 17-
19) from the agents should emerge from the autonomous decisions of individual agents, 
and each agent’s decisions should be made solely on the basis of its local environment. 
Complex systems tend to be sensitive to initial conditions, experience phase transitions, 
and exhibit scale-invariance in some aspects of their (dynamic) behavior. Models and 
understandings generated in various complexity fields provide much of the fundamental 
theoretical underpinnings of this research.  
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are complex systems as above that also have 
the ability to adapt. John Holland has developed a model of CAS in which he says that 
adaptation is how the “organism fits itself to its environment,” and that “experience 
guides changes in the organism’s structure… [in order to] make better use of its 
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environment for its own ends” (Holland, 1995, p. 9). Agents acting in relation to their 
surroundings do so in order to be more successful in that local environment. Activity at 
the local level is the source of emergent patterns viewed from one or more levels up. So, 
for example, the day-to-day activities of individual bees, all performed relative to each 
bee’s immediate surroundings, results in the very organized and self-sustaining pattern 
that we call beehives.  
Learning as a complex adaptive system (LCAS), the idea we are trying to 
develop, is a model of classroom learning that is closely patterned after John Holland’s 
CAS (1995). While our larger research agenda includes several levels of modeling 
learning as a complex system, this portion of the project is solely focused on the search 
for scale-invariant behaviors across several levels (individuals, classrooms of students, 
and aggregations of classrooms) of organization. Finding scale-invariance in classroom 
settings is a powerful indicator that these environments, and the activity that occurs in 
them, can be profitably thought of as (highly adaptive) complex systems. 
Scale invariance is a property of complex systems that is the result of chaotic 
behaviors at phase transitions (c.f., Cancho & Sole´, 2003). The behaviors of agents self-
organize and produce stable patterns of activity when viewed from another system—that 
is, from some number of levels up. The patterns that emerge produce power-law relations 
between selected system parameters in contrast to the more familiar Gaussian, bell-
shaped types of patterns. In Gaussian distributions, it is easy to find a central value that 
best approximates the distribution as a whole, and variations that are much different from 
average are highly unlikely. In power-law relations, there is no notion of an average 
value, and instead there is a non-zero probability of a broad spectrum of values across, in 
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some cases, many levels of magnitude. For the sake of clarity we mention that we 
consider scale-invariance and self-similarity to be different ways of describing the same 
phenomenon.  
This research project has required and will continue to require the development of 
a collection of conceptual and computer-based tools. Complexity-based models of 
learning both structure the research and are the aims of the research. We view learning as 
a complex adaptive system and that helps us to determine what to look for and what to 
expect. As we gain experience doing that, we intend to revise and improve our conceptual 
model so that it can be more useful to researchers, and will become useful for 
practitioners, and ultimately, learners. We are also developing conceptual and computer-
based tools for designing and building classroom activities (participatory simulations) 
that can simultaneously provide us with extensive databases on how people actually 
engaged with our learning activities.  
The results of this iteration of design-based research replicate previous findings, 
namely, that subjects engaged in participatory simulations exhibit scale-invariant 
behaviors. Beyond replication, the current work extends the previous work by identifying 
the same type of scale-invariance in two other participatory simulations. We also provide 
a brief discussion of some of the postulated sources of scale-invariance and a tentative 
outline of an alternative approach relative to learning that focuses on learner optimization 
processes. We conclude by offering a brief discussion of future work.  
Methods 
We collected data from a convenience sample of three pre-service teacher 
education classrooms participating in a simple whole-class algebra activity, a biology-
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related foraging simulation (Hills & Stroup, 2004), and a disease simulation (Wilensky & 
Stroup, 2002), all built in the HubNet participatory simulations environment (Wilensky & 
Stroup, 1999). Each of these activities included participants (pre-service mathematics and 
science teachers) using laptop computers that were wirelessly connected to a central 
computer. The central computer hosted the simulation and projected the simulation 
interface for each of the activities onto a large screen at the front of the classroom. 
Students were represented in the up front space by a variety of avatars so that they could 
find themselves and see where they were in relation to other participants and the field. 
The participants’ computers had interfaces with buttons to push for moving in the field 
and that provided them with important information about the location, direction of 
motion, amounts of resources they had acquired, and so on. 
Extremely powerful affordances of the HubNet/NetLogo software environment 
include the types and quantities of information that the software enables us to collect. The 
“export world” feature of NetLogo allows us to capture the entire state of the system 
across time frames as small as tenths of seconds and store the information in data files. 
We can then re-play the simulation in its entirety and extract any variable quantities (e.g., 
times between moves, sick or well, location and direction of avatar, etcetera) for any or 
all of the participants. In each of the simulation-experiments that we report on here, we 
were solely concerned with the time-between-moves of the participants in the HubNet 
activities. 
Algebra Activity 
This is a very simple activity that we often use to help new participants get 
familiar with HubNet, with the interfaces on their computers and with the up-front space. 
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To begin, we started once more with a 31 by 31 grid of patches and the software placed 
the participant-avatars at random locations on the grid. The interface on each individual’s 
computer registered the x- and y-coordinates of their current position and they were able 
to move up, down, left, or right one patch at a time. The students were instructed to 
“move until your y-value is the same as your x-value,” and as they did a diagonal line of 
avatars emerged in the up-front space. Again the technology enables us to capture all 
pertinent information about participants’ movements and elapsed time between moves.  
Forager Simulation 
In the foraging simulation, each participant controlled the search patterns of an 
individual forager-avatar in the 2-dimensional field of the up-front space. The 
participants’ goal was to find invisible “food” patches that were grouped together in 
small regularly shaped clumps (Figure 2.1). The field was a 31 by 31 square grid of 
patches that might or might not contain resources. Participants could move their avatars 
up, down, left, or right one patch at a time for each individual move and the simulation 
speed was such that avatars responded in less than 250ms. As participants moved around 
in this simulation, they were not able to see the locations of the food resources but could 
see themselves and their own locations and the movements of the other players in the 
upfront space. Monitors on the HubNet interface informed players as to whether or not 
they were on a patch with food and their total accumulation of food resources. Figure 2.1 
shows food patches in orange for illustration purposes, but the participants could not see 
them. Counting monitors on individuals’ interfaces provided participants with their only 
indications that they were on a food source.  
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Figure 2.1 A screen-shot of the Forager playing field. The pink crosses are food 
resources, the other icons on the screen are participants in the simulation. 
 
By moving around the playing field participants could construct mental images of 
the underlying distribution of resources and as they encountered patches with food the 
computer interface registered the “hit.”  Using this information, they could then adapt 
their foraging behavior to take advantage of the fact that the food was distributed in 
clumps, working carefully around the nearby patches. Students could also listen to and 
see the actions of the other participants and use that information to make decisions about 
where to move next. Separate resources were allocated for each participant, so students 
were not competing for resources and resource locations were the same for all players. 
Throughout the simulation we recorded all information about the avatars including 
position, resources acquired, and wait times between moves in the simulation space. 
Disease Participatory Simulation 
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In this simulation of the way a disease might propagate through a population we 
begin with a square grid appropriately sized to accommodate the number of participants, 
in this case, with a 21 by 21 patches grid. The participants are able to move up, down, 
left, or right and are able to choose their “step size” to be integer numbers of patches 
from one to five. The participants’ primary goal in this simulation is to evade contagious 
avatars and remain well for as long as possible. The computer interfaces have the usual 
motion buttons and a monitor box that indicates if they are infected or not. The up-front 
space displays the positions and motions of each of the participant-avatars, whether an 
avatar is infected, and a graph that displays the number of infected participants for every 
tick of the clock. In addition, the simulation marks avatars with a highly visible red dot 
when they are infected and has the ability add “androids,” additional avatars that that 
move randomly and can become ill and infect others. The software enables us to capture 
every simulation variable at every tick of the clock, thus giving us the capability to 
actually re-play the simulation at a later time.  
Data Analysis 
For the purposes of this experiment we were only interested in the time that 
participants took between “button-presses,” that is, in the elapsed time between 
participants’ moves in the up-front space and we captured that information for every 
participant in every run of the simulations. We measured the time participants took 
between button-presses in the simulation and, following Zipf (1949), calculated the log of 
individual decision times. Those data are plotted against the log of the rank of the 
individual decision times where the rank is simply a rank ordering of decision times by 
their duration. The data were analyzed at the level of individuals, classes, and an 
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aggregation of all participants. The data were plotted, least-squares lines were fitted to 
the data and correlation constants were calculated. At this early juncture in the research 
we are not able to assign meaning to the slopes of the curves or their x- or y-intercepts 
and are only concerned with the high degrees of linearity in the relationships between 
logs of the decision times and the logs of the ranks of the decision times. 
Results 
As we will illustrate, the data obtained in this study share a significant similarity 
with data from a previous study (Hills, et al., 2007) on scale invariance in a HubNet 
(Wilensky & Stroup, 1999) simulation. The decision times data obtained from a Forager 
Simulation at the levels of individuals, classrooms, and aggregations of classrooms have 
the same type of power law distributions and high degrees of correlation as the previous 
data. Beyond replication of the previous study, we have succeeded in extending our 
findings to two different HubNet classroom activities, where the same types of scale-
invariant behaviors are in evidence at the individual, group, and aggregate levels. 
A Discussion of the Data 
First we make a case for excluding decision times of less than a second from the 
data analysis. In the earlier study (Hills, et al., 2007) participants interacting with the 
Foraging Simulation at intervals under one second were observed to be most intent upon 
moving quickly through the resource space, apparently paying little attention as to 
direction, the activities of others, or the distribution of underlying resources. After the 
simulation, students reported that longer wait times were used to “think about where the 
resources might be” (p. 231). According to the participants, longer periods of thinking 
before a move resulted in better success in the problem environment. Our previous 
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analyses demonstrated that participants that performed well in terms of amount of food 
acquired per step sampled primarily from slower temporal distributions while participants 
who scored the smallest values of “food per step” sampled from distinctly faster temporal 
distributions. While this experiment cannot shed light on learning per se, we reason that 
individuals who were more successful in acquiring resources were more apt to be 
strategizing and adapting strategies in ways that are related to learning. 
In a three-classes aggregation of decision times in the Disease Participatory 
Simulation the distinctive “elbow” that we have seen previously (Hills, et al., 2007, p. 
233) appears at decision times of a little more than one second (Figure 2.2a.). When the 
data set is (somewhat arbitrarily) separated at the one-second point, the slopes of the least 
squares fits become -.596 (for decision times greater than one second) and -3.70 (decision 
times of 0 to 1 second), and the correlation constants for the partitioned data sets improve 
substantially to .902 and .963 respectively. While the correlation coefficient for the entire 
data set is .795, partitioning the data into decision times greater or less than one second 
results in two regions with significantly different slopes and higher correlations.  
Figure 2.2a clearly illustrates the elbow in the data, with the dashed line 
indicating a decision time of one second. Two distinct slopes are clearly in evidence. We 
saw this same general trend throughout the experiment—in the three different classroom 
activities shorter decision times lead to steeper slopes and longer decision times resulted 
in shallower slopes in the least squares fit lines. Zipf plots of the decision times data 
across the three simulations are quite similar in many respects, and intriguingly different 
in others. Examining the nuances and subtleties of the data generated in these design 
experiments must be left for subsequent and more highly informed iterations.  
52 
         
        (a)                                         (b)                                         (c) 
Figure 2.2. (a) Zipf curve for decision times in a Disease Simulation run, aggregation of 
decision times from three classes (N = 688). Decision times of less than one second are 
below the dashed line. (b) and (c), Zipf curve of decision times for a single participant. 
As in the aggregated data from three classes, two slopes prevail, with the inflection point 
falling at decision times of approximately one second. 
 
A plausible explanation for the appearance of an elbow in our data comes from 
studies in human reaction times (c.f., Sanders, 1998), where times to produce an action 
(e.g. depressing a brake pedal) are investigated and measured under varieties of 
conditions. Not surprisingly, it turns out that reaction times are dependent upon, among 
other things, the relative degree of cognitive processing necessary to perform the action. 
“Simple reaction times” are shorter and do not require cognitive processing, while 
“complex reaction times” are longer and involve varying degrees of cognitive processing 
before a reaction to a stimulus occurs (Kosinski, 2006). This is a key distinction being 
made in the current research, that longer times before making a decision and pushing a 
HubNet button are correlated with some sort of cognitive processing relative to 
participation in the simulation.  
Reaction times are affected by many factors such as fatigue, stress, and level of 
engagement, and as such are task-dependent and difficult to measure accurately and 
reproducibility. Still more tenuous would be trying to characterize the sort of “thinking” 
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or cognitive processing that goes on in such short periods of time. However, the lower 
limit of complex reaction times seems to be an easier thing to estimate because any 
complex reasoning must take more time than, say average measured values of simple 
reaction times, by definition. Lower limits on complex reaction times appear to be on the 
order of  .7 seconds to 1.25 seconds (Green, 2000, p. 213) for automobile braking, and we 
assume that limits on complex reaction times in a HubNet Simulation would be similar.  
For the foregoing reasons, we consider decision times shorter than one second to 
be simple reaction times, where participants’ actions would be limited to simply pressing 
a HubNet button without spending time thinking about the move. We consider decision 
times longer than a second to be the time it takes to push the button together with some 
additional time spent on deciding which of the buttons to push. Further, we expect longer 
decision times are more likely to provide meaningful information about the subjects’ 
thought processes. We have truncated our decision time data sets at one second, assuming 
that only longer decision times can provide time for goal-directed cognitive processing. 
Scale Invariance Across Participatory Simulations Activities  
The results of this segment of our research project indicate that, as in the previous 
research (Hills, et al., 2007), there is a scale-invariant power law relationship (c.f. Zipf, 
1949) between simulation participants’ decision times and the rank ordering of those 
decision times. Figures 2.3-2.6 show that in each of three participatory simulations 
(Wilensky & Stroup, 1999) relatively long decision times happen infrequently and short 
decision times occur most often. The data indicate that log-log relationships in decision 
times occur at the individual, classroom, and aggregations of classrooms levels, are 
linearly correlated, and typically have high correlation coefficients (>.90).
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                (a)                (b)                                             (c) 
Figure 2.3 Data from Hills et al. (2007), decision times in Forager Simulations for (a) an 
individual, (b) a classroom, and (c) an aggregation of simulations from three classrooms. 
 
 
          (a)                   (b)                                        (c) 
Figure 2.4 Zipf curves for decision times, Forager Simulation, for (a) an individual 
participant, (b) a single run in one classroom, (c) aggregated data of three classrooms.  
 
                           
(a)                                      (b) 
Figure 2.5 Zipf curves for decision times, Algebra Activity, for (a) one participant and 
(b) an entire class. 
 
 
          (a)                                 (b)                                        (c) 
Figure 2.6 Zipf curves for decision times, Disease Simulation, for (a) an individual 
participant, (b) a single run in one classroom, (c) aggregated data of three classrooms. 
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The results reported here replicate and extend the previous findings to two 
additional participatory activities. Casual observation of the up-front participation space 
would lead one to believe that the players’ activities were quite chaotic—no visible 
pattern of activity was discernable. However, when viewed in particular ways, the 
simulation activity was highly organized—producing highly correlated power law 
relationships. Viewing classroom activity as a complex system encouraged the discovery 
of a high degree of organization in an apparently highly disorganized activity. 
At one level, that is the major finding of this iteration of design research. While it 
is very tempting to try and interpret the results of this research in such a way as to shed 
light on learning, neither this experiment nor its predecessor was designed to 
systematically investigate learning. In the previous work, we saw a positive correlation 
between success in the Forager Simulation and the time participants took between 
decisions to move. While that may say something about participants’ abilities to 
successfully adapt, it is still quite far from saying much about common definitions of 
learning. It is expected that in future experiments we will be able to design activities that 
more closely approximate activity that can be construed as learning and we may start to 
develop useful understandings of the subtler differences in correlations. 
Discussion 
Power law relations have been found in growth patterns of the World Wide Web 
(Barabasi & Albert, 1999), in the evolution of genera (Reed & Hughs, 2002a), in 
information theory (Shannon, 1948), in language modeling (Rosenfeld, 1996), in the 
frequency of word occurrences (Zipf, 1932), in distributions of city sizes (Zipf, 1949), in 
language development (Cancho & Sole´, 2003) as well as in many other disciplines. In 
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each of the research reports listed above, mechanisms for the emergence scale invariance 
are postulated, and brief discussions of these mechanisms are provided next. 
Scale Invariant Systems 
With respect to the World Wide Web, a model of network “growth with 
preferential attachment” (Barabasi & Albert, 1999) is offered that combines the 
properties of random addition of nodes and preferential attachment between nodes. This 
is a “rich-get-richer” (p. 511) scenario, where the web expands through the addition of 
new nodes that are more likely to attach to nodes that are connected to many others. The 
authors show that random growth or preferential attachment alone do not lead to scale 
invariance, it is only when the two properties are combined and allowed to interact that 
power laws emerge from the system.  
Relative to the evolution of genera Reed and Hughes (2002a) propose a model of 
how species grow and evolve. Theirs is a "... model of macroevolution in which 
speciations and extinctions are assumed to occur independently and at random, and in 
which new genera are formed by the random splitting of existing genera" (p. 125). They 
go on to describe this mechanism (mathematically) as a “homogenous birth and death 
process” (p. 126) that takes into account that genera have been in existence for varying 
lengths of time. Reed and Hughes (2002b) extend modeling of this type to several other 
natural processes.  
Shannon (1948) and Rosenfeld (1996) use entropy-based models to account for 
information transmission in which the ratio of signal to noise is used to get measures of 
the entropy of information and communication. More recently, Cancho and Sole´ (2003) 
used an entropy-based approach to model the onset and development of human 
57 
languages. Their model is based on the simultaneous minimization of speaker costs and 
hearer costs as language evolves. In their single parameter entropy model, power law 
relations are generated as optimizations between hearer costs and speaker costs are 
reached. 
Each of these types of explanations may have value for explorations of the scale-
invariant behaviors found in classrooms. It may well be that “knowledge networks” can 
be discovered that are amenable to the types of network modeling that considers growth 
with preferential attachment or Reed and Hughes’ model of the growth of genera. It also 
seems likely that the sorts of entropy modeling of scale-invariant systems could play a 
major role in understanding how the behaviors of agents in a system can produce scale 
invariance. However, it is George Zipf’s (1949) “principle of least effort” that we believe 
will provide a strong basis for useful thinking about classroom learning. 
Least Effort and Optimization 
The principle of least effort (Zipf, 1949) states that the goal-directed behaviors of 
humans are governed by the estimation and anticipation of ways of acting that minimize 
effort over long run. He uses an example of travel between two cities with a mountain 
range between them. In that case, the traveler may choose any of several paths, the 
shortest, the fastest, or the easiest. Zipf’s principle makes a bold claim—namely that “the 
entire behavior of an individual is at all times motivated by the urge to minimize effort” 
(p. 3). While we may not believe that all human behavior is governed by attempts to 
minimize work, we do believe that the notion of optimization may be a powerful tool for 
research on learning. It seems quite plausible to us that the activity of learners in 
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classrooms is the result of their making conscious and subconscious optimization 
decisions. 
In conjunction with Zipf’s principle of least effort, consider John Holland’s 
(1995) modeling of complex adaptive systems (CAS). We have noted above that CAS 
adapt in order to be more successful in their environments, and in each of the models, 
Zipf’s or Holland’s, we see optimization—either in minimizing effort or maximizing 
“fit.” So of all the proposed mechanisms for producing scale invariance, we find this 
notion of optimization as having the most potential for modeling learning. It seems 
plausible that in a particular situation, it may be possible to model learners’ behaviors as 
entropy-like calculations between a relatively small number of options.  
Optimizations in learning are not apt to be precise as entropy calculations that can 
be stated in either-or terms, minimizations of speaker costs or hearer costs, for example. 
We conjecture that learners in classrooms may be simultaneously optimizing across a 
variety of purposes and goals, perhaps even making “nested optimizations,” where a 
given optimization estimate would be made in the context of a prior optimization. In 
keeping with our view of learning as a complex adaptive system (Hurford, 2004; 
Hurford, in review; Hurford, in preparation) optimizations might be seen as being 
“mutually constitutive”—each influencing and being influenced by others. If our 
conjectures prove fruitful it may become possible to identify high likelihood optimization 
“poles” in well-defined classroom situations and to move toward much more 
mathematized modeling of learner behaviors. Experiments along these lines are expected 
in the near future. 
Reflections 
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On Theory and Methods 
There are certainly a great variety of perspectives on classroom learning, what 
learning means, and how to promote it. It is always the case that different perspectives on 
education and learning highlight some aspects thereof and push other aspects to the 
background. It is only natural to try and simplify our relations with our environment so 
that we have more cognitive capacity for understanding some subset of associations 
within it. Each of the theoretical and methodological perspectives has helped educators 
and researchers to tease meaning out of what Dr. Ann Brown has called the “blooming 
buzzing confusion” of real-life classrooms (Brown, 1992, p. 141, after James, 1981, p. 
462). The purpose of our work is to develop and explore yet another in a long line of 
perspectives on learning. 
Theoretical models underpin research, and the models and questions being asked 
should point to particular methodologies for the investigation. The theoretical 
perspectives that frame this research are a combination of cognitive psychology and the 
complexity sciences. The question that framed the study was whether we would find the 
same types of scale invariance in decision times of participants across different types of 
participatory simulations, and design based research methods structured our 
investigation. The twin aims of design research, building theory in tandem with designing 
and assessing classroom practice fits our research and dispositions very well. 
While this research focuses quite narrowly along “science-based” and 
cognitively-based lines, that position does not imply that other perspectives (e.g., socio-
cultural, radical constructivist, critical) are not also valid and useful tools and means for 
understanding learning. In fact, systems research explicitly studies systems within 
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systems and so understands well the concept of the embeddedness and mutual 
constituency of systems. We see that our cognitive-science-based view of learning is 
happening in multiple contexts and we fully understand that those contexts affect the 
systems that we are studying. 
We are invested in modeling learning as a complex system and in helping to begin 
the process of infusing complexity-based curriculum at all levels of the educational 
system. The research reported here has identified a hallmark of complex systems, scale 
invariant (self-similar) behaviors in the activity of simulation participants. The 
phenomenon is robust—occurring at multiple levels from a single run of a single 
individual to aggregations of data from multiple classrooms over multiple runs of the 
simulation. It is also robust across simulations—we found the same power law relations 
in three different participatory simulations activities.  
The participatory simulations were a vital component of an instructional unit 
intended to introduce classes of pre-service mathematics and science teachers about 
complex systems and about learning as a complex system. The hope is that learning about 
and learning as will be mutually informative and provide the pre-service teachers with 
both increased understandings and tools for teaching. Relative to pedagogical content 
knowledge, teachers need to have content knowledge in order to teach a subject well and 
a secondary goal of our work is to provide teachers and with better understandings of 
complex systems in general.  Our research projects are firmly grounded in building 
models of learning as complex systems and in teaching learners about complex systems.  
On Zipf Curves and Learning 
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A question that needs to be addressed concerns the relation of the data reported 
here to learning. Specifically, what does a doubly logarithmic relation between the 
elapsed time between button presses and the rank ordering of those times have to do with 
learning? The answer may be, very little actually. But that answer misses the point. The 
point is that the activity that goes on in classrooms can be viewed, at a theoretical level, 
as a complex adaptive system, and that means that there exist powerful analytic tools and 
computer modeling capabilities that can be used to make sense of classroom learning. We 
have a characteristic fingerprint of complex systems in students’ participatory simulations 
and so we believe we are justified in making the fundamental assumption that the 
participants’ activity constitutes a CAS. We have only begun to experiment with the data 
collection, the activity design, and the analysis of the data that we have developed the 
ability to obtain. 
On Tools and Technology 
 The tools that we are using and developing in this series of research projects 
deserve some discussion. First, the fact that students can be introduced to complex 
systems and in the same class period can experience being a complex system, in the 
participatory simulations, is an exceedingly important capability. There are obvious 
differences between reading about a phenomenon and personally experiencing it, and we 
see this as an important feature of the classroom experiences we are designing.  
 The same computer software that hosts the participatory simulations has the 
capability to manageably collect a wealth of information about the participants’ activities 
and thus provides for multiple and fine-grained analyses of the data. The 
HubNet/NetLogo (Wilensky & Stroup, 1999, 2002) software captures the state of every 
62 
simulation variable, the activities of the participants, and the states of the simulation-
participants system at very short time intervals, enabling visual replay of the activity that 
can support reflective post-simulation analyses by researchers, teachers, and students. At 
the same time, we can obtain the time between decisions/actions by every participant in 
every simulation in order to discover and report the findings in this article. 
 Beyond computer-based tools we are developing conceptual models of learning 
based in complexity, and believe complexity-based modeling of learning is also a 
technological step forward for the learning theories discipline. Learning systems from 
individuals to organizations are being described in the literature, and complexity lenses 
are being used to describe, predict, and explain systems’ observable behaviors. Modeling 
learning as complex system provides a structure and points at methodological approaches 
for studying learning that is truly unique. 
 Our particular theorizing about learning as a complex system is structured by John 
Holland’s ECHO model (Holland, 1995), modified somewhat by distinctly cognitive 
psychological assumptions regarding the models that Holland postulates complex 
adaptive systems create and use. That structure tells us where to look for how the CAS 
proceeds (the mechanisms; Holland, 1995), what the process should look like (the 
processes; Holland, 1995), and that we may expect to find self-similarity and scale 
invariance in the dynamic activity of complex adaptive systems. The modeling itself 
becomes a technology in itself that can be used to make sense of learning in new ways. 
On Future Directions for this Research 
 This line of research is in its very early stages, and much remains to be done. 
Building a theoretical perspective on learning will require generating convincing real-
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world examples to explicate the LCAS model and how the perspective can be used to 
further understandings of learning. Viewing learning through complex adaptive systems 
lenses is helping us to design instruction (see Section Three) and to analyze learning in 
terms of the models learners use and the memes in their environments that they 
incorporate into new and emergent models. In keeping with our research methodology, 
the next iteration of this series of design experiments will attend to theory-building, 
teaching practice, and to the design of the research methods.  
 Our proposed theory of LCAS will direct our next investigations. We will try to 
develop new participatory simulations that can provide better feedback relative to the 
models participants are using and the strategies that they use in the simulation. Using 
these new simulations, we will again put the notion of scale-invariance in decision times 
“in harm’s way” (Cobb, et al., 2003, p. 10) by performing analyses similar to those 
described here on the new data. We will begin to operationalize and look specifically for 
the processes (flow, aggregation, non-linearity, and diversity [Holland, 1995] that we 
believe will add to our understandings of classroom learning systems.  
 From a research methods perspective, many improvements are expected. With 
continued collaboration with a widening group of members from “the three tiers” (Lesh 
& Kelly, 2000), we expect develop more sophisticated means for assessing the models 
learners are using and to improve those assessments such that we obtain clearer pictures 
of participants’ adaptations. We expect that participant interviews will help to inform our 
understandings of the strategies and models that the learners use. From the perspective of 
classroom practice we will redesign our introduction to complex systems based on 
feedback from the current experiment and try and improve on the levels of understanding 
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of systems and particularly learning as a complex adaptive system for future classes of 
pre-service mathematics and science students.  
Closing 
 Complex systems ideas are becoming increasingly important in the learning 
sciences (c.f., IJLS, January, 2006) and in developing better understandings of the world 
in many disciplines. There can be little doubt that human learning may be profitably 
construed as a complex system. With complex systems frameworks, we can move closer 
to increasingly mathematized models of learning that have the potential to inform 
practice. With research in learning about complex systems and in teaching pre-service 
teachers about complex systems, we have the potential to move school curricula toward 
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The shortage of qualified mathematics and science teachers is a problem of 
national proportions (National Academy of Sciences, 2007, pp. 113-114) that will require 
extraordinary and innovative solutions. One very successful program designed to respond 
to the challenges described in the National Academy’s report is the UTeach teacher 
preparation program at the University of Texas at Austin.  The UTeach program, soon to 
be initiated at several large research universities around the country1, specializes in 
recruiting highly qualified science and mathematics students into the teaching profession. 
Faculty members in the program have dual missions: to prepare excellent next-generation 
mathematics and science teachers and to generate and disseminate effective research on 
how to understand and promote learning (Petrosino & Dickinson, 2003). The research 
reported here was carried out in that spirit in one of the three core classes of the UTeach 
program—the Knowing and Learning in Mathematics and Science course.  
A Discussion of the Course Structure 
In Knowing and Learning, pre-service science and mathematics teachers are 
introduced to theories of learning and to ways in which theories of learning may be used 
to inform instruction. A key assumption of the course is that science and mathematics can 
be seen as content that is to be taught and as a way characterizing and assessing the 
learning we intend to produce. An example of content becoming a framework for 
knowing and learning is that in a biology course we may teach students about the 
relationship between genetics and a person’s height. That biological model becomes a 
way of thinking about knowing and learning when we posit the same type of relationship 
between genetics and intelligence quotients. The same natural selection, variation, and 
mutations that affect height or bone structure are thought of as resulting in a measurable 
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quantity like height, called intelligence. Piaget used the mathematical framework of the 
algebraic group to theorize about learning (Piaget, 1971; Beth & Piaget, 1966) and we 
often use statistical mathematics in the form of standardized tests to make important 
decisions about teaching. A primary commitment of the Knowing and Learning course is 
to take seriously and make explicit this co-constitutive relationship between content and 
theories of learning and to purposefully consider the interactions between content and 
learning in ways that can meaningfully inform our students’ pedagogical understandings 
and practices.  
The Knowing and Learning course is taught as a sequence of units on major 
learning theoretical approaches, both historical and current we generally follow a similar 
instructional trajectory in each of the units:  
a) begin a unit with introductory readings that introduce students to the 
perspective being investigated; 
b) students respond to a set of instructional questions on the readings via the 
internet and a course web page; 
c) an instructor provides lecture and guides discussion of the readings and the 
perspective; 
d) the students engage in some activity chosen to illustrate principles being 
discussed; 
e) learning progress is assessed and the results are used in future course design 
cycles. 
It is often the case that the instructor that is directing classroom discussions is an invited 
expert in the science or mathematical domain that is being used to structure the 
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perspective on learning under consideration. It is also the case that while we are 
designing and implementing instruction in the classroom we are simultaneously 
collecting and analyzing information relative to our teaching, the learning outcomes 
achieved, and the design of subsequent classroom instruction. 
   The teaching experiment that we are reporting on was designed in a way that 
was consistent with the unit trajectory discussed above and was focused on complex 
systems as a content topic. Complex systems approaches have provided powerful insights 
and new knowledge in a wide range of scientific disciplines from physics (Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1997), to biology (Camazine, et al., 2001), to social phenomena such as the 
growth of the internet (Barbasi & Albert, 1999) and human language development 
(Cancho & Sole´, 2003). One of the theoretical foundations of our teaching experiment 
was that classroom learning can plausibly considered to be a complex system (Hills, 
Hurford, Stroup, & Lesh, 2007) and can be treated as such when designing classroom 
instruction. The particular complex systems perspective that we have chosen to structure 
this instruction and experimental investigation originates with the work of John Holland 
(1995). His is a complex adaptive systems model intended to be applicable to a wide 
range of complex systems and we have extended Holland’s model to take into 
consideration specifically human behaviors. 
In keeping with the overall structure of the course, instruction provided to the 
UTeach Knowing and Learning students for this teaching experiment included a text-
based introduction to complexity and learning as a complex system, asked web-based 
guided feedback questions on the readings, offered lecture and group discussion 
opportunities, and facilitated the students’ participation in complex systems simulations 
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(Wilensky & Stroup, 1999). The unit concluded with a third set of web-based survey 
questions intended to assess and provide insights into student learning. 
In previous work (Hills, Hurford, Stroup, & Lesh, 2007; Hurford, in preparation; 
Hurford, 1998) we have argued that classroom learning at individual and group levels is 
consistent with several of the formal criteria necessary a system’s being classified as 
complex. A question that we seek to respond to here is “what would considering learning 
to be a complex system mean for science and mathematics teaching and for pre-service 
teacher preparation?” Fostering a conversation about complex systems and learning as a 
complex system in the UTeach Program and in the larger teaching and learning 
community is the primary motivation for our design research program. 
Theoretical Underpinnings of this Research 
This line of educational research, while on the one hand working to generate 
theory and models, is at the same time strongly influenced by established theories of 
learning and by the complexity sciences. In this section we discuss the theoretical 
foundations of our research agenda. 
Cognitive Perspectives 
This project shares fundamental assumptions with many established views on 
learning. The work reported in the present paper is essentially a teaching experiment 
(Lesh & Kelly, 2000), the first phase of which is structured by a behaviorist/instructionist 
learning perspective (NRC, 2001, pp. 61-62; Sawyer, 2006, p. 10; Skinner, 1954). In the 
first phase of our design research, knowledge of complex systems (as curricular content) 
is viewed strictly as facts and terminology. Learning is taken to mean the ability to 
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respond to questions about the material covered in the supplied text in an acceptable 
manner.  
This admittedly restricted view of learning is augmented in the next phase of the 
experiment by the cognitivist views of selective attention (Anderson, 1982; Reynolds, 
1992) and rehearsal (Craik & Watkins, 1973). The idea here is that if students attend to 
the definitions and terms of the subject matter and have a chance to actively rehearse the 
material, they will be more likely to transfer the information from “working memory” to 
“long-term memory” (Royer, 1986, p. 89). These first two stages of the experiment were 
designed to effect and enable students’ learning about complex systems by causing the 
learners to attend to and rehearse text-based concepts. 
Borrowing from schema theoretical points of view (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 4) 
another assumption of this experiment is that the knowledge instilled in learners is 
contained in “conceptual ecologies” (Toulmin, 1972) that can structure and give meaning 
to subsequent complex systems experiences. The assumption here is that once students 
have created and activated conceptual frameworks of complex systems they will add to 
and substantially revise those frameworks in the context of experience.  
Our theoretical perspective is also firmly rooted in conceptual change literature 
(e.g., Strike & Posner, 1985, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). We designed the third 
stage of the teaching experiment based on assumptions related to adding onto and 
changing learners’ conceptual structures and to the constructivist notion that active 
participation in classroom-based problem solving extends and improves learners’ -
understandings. Thus, describing learning as a CAS is viewed in our research program as 
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a way of situating and combining existing learning theoretical frameworks into a 
cohesive package for designing effective classroom learning experiences. 
Complex Adaptive Systems Perspective 
Cognitively based theories of learning under-gird the design of successive stages 
of this teaching experiment. Those learning-theoretical approaches determine the nature 
of the project’s learning goals, the way we teach, and the formative assessments of the 
outcomes. However, the design of the progression from behaviorist to constructivist 
teaching and learning was itself directed a priori from a complex systems theoretical 
perspective. 
The model of learning that we hope to instantiate and fruitfully apply to 
classroom teaching and learning is firmly rooted in the science of complexity. John 
Holland’s model of complex adaptive systems (1995) is the theoretical foundation upon 
which our entire program of design research is based. With one extension, from tagging 
rules-sets to persistent internal models, we envision human learning as a Holland-inspired 
CAS, viewing learners and groups of learners as agents and meta-agents, and learning as 
adaptation.  
We see strong connections between established learning theory approaches and 
the complex adaptive systems model that we are using. “Schemas” (Andre, 1986, pp. 
187-188), “scripts” (Abelson & Shank, 1979) and persistent internal models are closely 
related—they are both thought of as being activated from some sort of memory, both 
become active relative to an environmental context, and both help CAS to make sense of 
their current situations. Knowledge-centered learning theories (Sawyer, 2006, p. 10) see 
knowledge as the accumulation of appropriately sized “bits” of information, and the CAS 
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model might refer to those bits as building blocks that are acquired through selective 
attention. We consider persistent internal model (PIMs) to be stored in “long-term 
memory” (Royer, 1986, p. 89) and our CAS learning approach sees real time internal 
models (RIMs) as being located in “working memory” (p. 89). The complex adaptive 
systems perspective provides a unique venue for combining multiple and in some ways 
discordant learning perspectives into a cohesive approach for thinking about learning and 
for designing instruction.   
Learning as a Complex Adaptive System 
When we think about how learning happens, we assume the entity that is doing 
the learning is a complex adaptive system. We further assume that the learning system 
can be modeled in agreement with John Holland’s (1995; see also Hurford, 2004; 
Hurford, in review) perspective, and that we should be able to identify what Holland calls 
attributes, mechanisms, and properties of the complex system we have chosen. When 
using systems approaches it is important to specify the system being studied. While there 
are many possible candidates in schools that could be considered to be learning systems, 
for the purposes of this article we choose to consider learning at the level of individual 
students, where the interacting agents are concepts and conceptual structures. We argue 
that viewing learners, as CAS, through Holland’s lens will provide us with powerful new 
“sightlines” (Hamilton, 2007) into, and knowledge about, learning. 
We propose a more sophisticated and specifically human mechanism that extends 
Holland’s (1995) tagging rules (p. 14) and refer to this revised mechanism as “persistent 
internal models” (PIMs). Persistent internal models are more than just tagging rules 
sets—we envision them as whole conceptual structures (mental models) that possess both 
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declarative and procedural information. PIMs have the same function as tagging 
mechanisms—they direct attention and enable attention to and acquisition of building 
blocks (Holland, 1995, p. 34) for composition into internal models. Once a persistent 
internal model is activated it enables the complex adaptive system to form a real-time 
internal model (RIM) of the situation that in turn enables the complex adaptive system to 
make sense of and adapt to its environment.  
The RIM is the same as Holland’s “internal model” (1995, p. 31), and we use the 
“real-time” distinction to discriminate between preexisting persistent internal models and 
these models that emerge in the moment, in response to a particular situation and context. 
Alternative PIMs may be retrieved and activated as situations change, and current RIMs 
will morph into new ones. Depending upon the relative success of the complex adaptive 
system’s activity, previous PIMs may be restructured and the new persistent internal 
model stored for future reference. We consider this restructuring to be a component of 
learning. We believe that our adapted CAS model of learning provides a powerful tool for 
designing and implementing classroom instruction, because it tells us where to look for 
learning (in RIMs and PIMs), tells us how to proceed (by appropriate distributions of 
building blocks), and points to sampling internal models in order to conduct formative and 
summative assessments.  
To summarize, complex systems are aggregations of agents, in individual learners 
we see these as concepts and conceptual structures, acting independently that create 
larger scale patterns of activity when viewed from outside the system.  Complex adaptive 
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systems are a subset of complex systems that have the ability to change themselves and 
their behaviors in response to feedback from their environment. John Holland (1995) 
generated a model of a more-or-less universal complex adaptive system, which we use to 
study learning. We have extended Holland’s mechanisms in order to take into account the 
human mechanisms of persistent internal models that develop into real time internal 
models. Throughout this design research experiment we use Holland’s CAS model to 
inform both how we think learning occurs, and how we design classroom-based learning 
activities.  
The Teaching Experiment 
The research question driving this iteration of teaching experiment was the 
following: 
How do the pre-service teachers perceive the mechanisms of the adapted Holland 
model of complex adaptive systems relative to their participation in the Disease 
simulation? 
The subjects were 34 pre-service secondary mathematics and science teachers 
enrolled in a domain-situated learning theories which is required of all students 
participating in the UTeach Program and the University of Texas at Austin. The study 
included about an equal mix of men and women and all of the students were pursuing 
bachelor’s degrees in the fields of mathematics and science as well as studying to become 
teachers. The sample was strictly a convenience sample, questions of generalizability to 
other populations of students and teachers were not addressed in this study. The purposes 
of this early iteration in our design research agenda were strictly exploratory: we wanted 
to begin the process of designing complex systems-based courseware, test the 
75 
introductory approach, engage the students in complex systems simulations, and obtain a 
measure of the students’ understandings of the subject materials after teaching the unit 
lesson. The CAS content was engaged in ways that are consistent with the overall design 
of the Knowing and Learning course—focusing on the interactions between domain 
content and theories of knowing and learning in ways that can inform teaching. The 
experiment unfolded in a series of three phases. 
Phase One 
Before the students could reasonably respond to our research question it was 
necessary to introduce them to complex systems terminology and ideas. They were 
provided with a journal-type article (Appendix A) to read before attending a lecture on 
the topic in the following class period.  The article, authored by one of our researchers, 
was an introduction to complex systems in general and then to our version of Holland’s 
complex adaptive systems model (1995) applied to learning. The students read the paper 
and responded to a set of questions designed so that the learners would rehearse and 
reinforce the ideas covered in the reading. The questions were presented on an Internet-
based web page and students’ written responses were captured electronically. This 
introduction to complexity was intended to be very knowledge-centered and instructionist 
(Sawyer, 2006, p. 10) in approach. We wanted to familiarize students with the major 
ideas and concepts and to try to get them to commit the more salient ideas to memory.  
The class meeting in this phase featured a knowledge-centered lecture on the 
assigned reading. At the conclusion of the first phase lecture the students engaged in the 
Forager Participatory Simulation (Hills & Stroup, 2004; Hills, Hurford, Stroup, & Lesh, 
2007) whole-class activity. In this activity, participants “forage” for clumps of hidden 
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food, simulating the behaviors characteristic of animals searching for food. The purpose 
of having students participate in this simulation was to familiarize them with the HubNet 
(Wilensky & Stroup, 1999) interface and to give them an introduction to being an agent 
in a complex adaptive system.  
Phase Two 
The next reading assignment was a chapter from Peter Senge’s book, the Fifth 
Discipline (1994, pp. 27-54). The chapter is a discussion of a simulated commodities 
distribution supply chain, and presents a classic complex systems activity that is widely 
used in business school classrooms. The purpose of the reading was to deepen students’ 
knowledge of complex systems and to illustrate how complex systems can produce 
effects that the system, rather than the participants, is responsible for. This reading, as 
with the previous reading, was accompanied by a set of internet-based response 
questions. While the Phase 1 reading on complex adaptive systems was new to the 
course, the Senge reading and questions were the same as those that had been used in 
previous semesters. This provided us with an opportunity to see how students’ 
understandings of systems may have been affected by the first complex systems reading 
assignment. 
Phase Three 
The third phase of this design experiment included a discussion of the Senge 
reading, a brief review of complex adaptive systems ideas and terminology, a whole-class 
participatory simulation focused on disease transmission, and a related set of web-based 
response questions. The bulk of the time in Phase 3 was spent doing multiple runs of the 
Disease Simulation (Wilensky & Stroup, 2002). Following the simulation activity the 
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students were asked to respond to a third set of web response questions intended to obtain 
information relative to the research question—what aspects of the mechanisms of the 
adapted CAS model did the participants recognize in their simulation based activity? The 
questions asked of the students, their responses and our commentaries for each of the 
three phases of the experiment are reported below. 
Methods 
After immersion in the answers to the questions we had asked we developed scoring 
rubrics for assessing students’ responses. The first rubric (Table 3.1) was based in 
knowledge-centered learning theory and was a way of scoring the students’ responses—
either the students supplied the answers we thought best, or they did not. The questions 
asked relative to the Senge (1994) reading were a mixture of knowledge-centered and 
more open-ended questions. While the Phase One reading on complex adaptive systems 
was new to the course, the Senge reading and questions were the same as previous 
semesters. This provided us with an opportunity to compare our responders with prior 
students to get an idea of how the present class’s understandings may have been affected 
by the first complex systems reading assignment.  
With the exception of the first question asked, the Phase Three web-response 
questions were much more open-ended. The first question was knowledge-centered and 
was intended to assess what and how much about the mechanisms of complex adaptive 
systems (the Phase One reading) the students could recall. The remaining questions were 
designed to shed light on how the simulation participants were making sense of the 
mechanisms of CAS and whether or not they were engaging with the ideas in general. 
The web questions for this phase of the experiment were more intended to provide the 
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researchers with insights into students’ thinking about complex systems than they were to 
be summative assessments of student knowledge.  
 
Table 3.1 
Web-Based Questions and Scoring Rubric Relative to the Complex Systems Reading. 
1. What is a system as defined in “Thinking of Learning as a Complex Dynamical 
System” (p. 3)? 
Rubric Scoring: Award 1 point each for mentioning “some number of agents,” 
“patterns of behavior,” “hierarchical levels,” “tagging-type rules.” (4 points) 
2. Give 2 examples of complex systems from biology. 
Rubric scoring: Multiple answers to this open-ended question were permissible. 
(2 points) 
3. Could traffic flow out on Interstate 35 be considered to be a system?  
Rubric scoring: “Yes” was the only accepted response. (1 point)  
4. List the 10 components of John Holland’s (1995) model of a complex adaptive system 
(p.11) 
Rubric Scoring: Typing in of all ten components was the only acceptable 
response. (1 point) 
5. What is a persistent internal model (PIM, p. 30). 
Rubric Scoring: Response should include—A persistent internal model is a 
conceptual structure, stored in long-term memory, and activated in response to the 
CAS’s current context. They are rules-like schemas that provide a basis for the 
79 
CAS’s parsing its local environment by selecting “building blocks.” The 
persistent internal model, under the influence of the new building blocks, 
becomes the real-time internal model. ( 0  4 points) 
6. What is a real-time internal model (RIM, pp. 30-31). 
Purpose: This is a rehearsal-directed question intended to get students to describe 
RIMs in their own words. 
Rubric Scoring: Response should include—A real-time internal model is an 
adapted persistent internal model. The PIM directs attention to building blocks, 
filling gaps or replacing elements, resulting in a new real-time internal model. The 
RIM then enables adaptation in the complex adaptive system such that it is better 
able to act in its environment. Based upon subsequent feedback, the RIM may be 
further adapted. Real-time internal models may be stored in long-term memory as 
persistent internal models. ( 0  4 points) 
 
Results 
The results for the first iteration of this teaching experiment were very 
encouraging. In general, students’ responses to the first set of web questions reflected 
reasonably good engagement with and understanding of the notions of complex systems. 
Their responses to the knowledge-centered questions demonstrated that the students had 
become familiar with the fundamental notions of complexity science and learning as a 
complex adaptive system. They participated in the classroom activities and made good 
efforts at making sense of the ideas and translating those ideas into conceptualizations of 
the real world. Beyond that, we, as researchers, made significant progress in developing a 
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unit plan and activities for helping teachers to understand the complexity sciences, a first 
step on the path of introducing complexity-based ideas and tools to the classrooms of 
tomorrow. 
Phase One Results 
The students read the opening paper (Appendix) and responded to the knowledge-
centered questions asked of them. As Table 3.2 indicates, the average response by 
students to a question asking for the definition of a “system” contained about three of the 
four points we considered necessary to adequately describe a system. Understanding the 
terminology and interactivity of systems is assumed to be prerequisite for developing a 
working knowledge of complexity and these students demonstrated strong beginnings in 
that direction. Questions two and three were intended to see if students could identify 
biological systems in natural and human-agent systems, and nearly all of the responders 
were able to do so. The fourth question was intended to simply have students “rehearse” 
(Pintrich, 1999) the components of a complex adaptive system and all students did. 
Questions five and six were more open-ended than the previous three but still contained 
direct links (page references) back to the assigned reading, thus maintaining a 
knowledge-centered flavor. Question five asked the students to discuss attributes of 
“persistent internal models” and had four assessment criteria. Respondents did a fairly 
good job of answering this question, with about two-thirds of the students naming at least 
half of the components we were looking for. The results for Question 6, the question 
relating to “real-time internal models” were similar, with again about two-thirds of the 




Phase 1 Scoring Rubric Results—Thirty-four Participants. 
Question  Results 
1 Twenty-two students listed three or four of the rubric criteria. 
2 Thirty students were able to correctly name 2 biological examples of complex 
systems. 
3 Thirty-two of the thirty-four students gave the recognized traffic flow as a 
complex adaptive system. 
4 All students responded correctly, that is each student “rehearsed” the list of 
components. 
5 Twenty-three of the students mentioned at least two of the four assessment 
criteria. 
6 Twenty-two of the thirty-four students mentioned at least two of the four 
assessment criteria. 
 
Phase Two Results 
The second phase of this teaching experiment consisted of the Senge (1994, pp. 
27-54) reading and a set of web-based questions relative to the reading and to the nature 
of systems. One of the more interesting results occurred in this phase of the experiment. 
None of the student responses to the Senge-focused questions made mention of the terms 
or ideas in the complex adaptive systems reading of Phase 1. Responses to the web 
questions were undifferentiable from those of the previous semester—apparently the 
students were making not connections between the two complex systems perspectives.  
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The complex adaptive systems model described in the Phase 1 reading (Appendix 
A) on an agent-based model of CAS—the focal point of the model is the adaptive agent. 
The Senge (1994) reading focuses on an aggregate-based view of complex systems where 
stocks and flows are driving metaphors. The fact that the students did not find 
connections between the two readings is actually consistent with a similar disconnect in 
the research literature associated with complex systems. While some have argued for the 
complementarity between the two approaches (Chen & Stroup, 1993) most complexity 
research tends to rely on either on agent-based approaches (e.g., Holland, 1995; 
Wooldridge, 2002) or aggregate-based approaches (e.g., Sterman, 2000; Forrester, 1968). 
It seems reasonable that if such a dichotomy appears in the research literature, one might 
expect to see the same cognitive disconnect in students newly introduced to the ideas. 
Further investigation of this phenomenon and making explicit the distinctions and 
potential complementarities of these two types of modeling is a new goal for future 
iterations of this project. 
Phase Three Results 
 
The results from the third set of web-based questions were rich with information 
about how students were making sense of complex systems and learning. For the current 
purposes we include evidence and discussion of how the students made sense of learning 
as a complex adaptive system—the extended model that we presented them with. We also 
focus on how the persistent internal models the students identified were adapted, and 
offer some insights and discussion of the students’ understandings of the Disease 
Simulation. 
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The basics of the model 
Most of the students responded to the first question we asked in ways that 
indicated that they had understood the basics of the three mechanisms as extended to 
learning as a complex adaptive system, persistent internal models (PIMs), building 
blocks, and real time internal models (RIMs). While not all of the students’ responses 
were as complete as these, we provide two excerpts to illustrate how they were thinking 
about the mechanisms. 
 
PIMs are the platform or the "basics" that preexist in your mind. The building 
blocks are things in real time that you can add to your platform to tweak and 
enhance your PIM but because it is in real time it becomes a RIM. An example is 
a naked Christmas tree as a PIM, building blocks are the ornaments and tinsel 
and lights and the new overall dressed tree is the RIM. 
 
a persistent internal model represents our accumulated understanding of a 
generalized situation or class of situations… in accordance with the pim we have 
conjured up, we choose what features in our environment will serve as building 
blocks in developing our real time internal model. this rim is formed by taking the 
pim as a kind of template and then continuously incorporating novel elements as 
our environment changes and as we are able to more accurately understand it. it 
is transient, constantly in flux…  
These student responses really get at the fundamental meanings of the 
mechanisms and serve as excellent examples of the kinds of understandings of learning 
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as a complex system that we want future mathematics and science teachers to have. They 
speak to the nature of learners’ internal models, their pre-existing “cognitive structures,” 
to the building blocks that are sampled from the learners’ environment, and to the real-
time models that learners use to make sense of and adapt to that environment.  
Adaptation of students’ internal models 
In this final phase of the experiment a student finally made reference to the Senge 
reading and a systems-based approach to thinking about the spread of disease. This 
student responsed to the question about their initial (persistent) internal model of the 
Disease Simulation in this way: 
After the Beer Game reading, I thought that this might be related to the idea that 
though a person's tendency would be to be reactive in the disease simulation, the 
"do nothing" approach [see Senge, 1994, p. 47] was actually more effective in 
avoiding infection for me. That reactivity was a PIM that came to mind. 
Which became the following real time internal model: 
I thought that the persistence of the patterns of the system's results was made 
evident. Initially, I thought that how I reacted could actually make a difference. 
This student started with an PIM that relates to an advantageous strategy discussed by 
Senge—doing nothing in the face of crisis in the system. In the end, the student suggests 
a much deeper understanding when they discuss the patterns of the system and echo 
Senge’s message that system failure can sometimes be natural outcomes of the system 
and not the fault of individuals. 
Another example illustrates adaptation toward an increasingly “mathematized” 
understanding of the spread of disease. One student described the persistent internal 
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model of the Disease Simulation in terms of “the smooth curves we work with in math 
classes.” After the simulation they had this to say about their emergent real-time model of 
disease spread. “we saw how the disease actually spread. [We] looked at the graph and 
adjusted our expectations to what was actually happening.” This student’s real time 
model of disease propagation went from an idealized model of a smooth curve to a 
contextualized model with more texture and uncertainty.  
Both of these examples of changes in students’ internal models indicate the types of 
changes in understandings that we seek to foster in this learning experiment. These are 
the sorts of persistent internal models—focused on mathematical representations and 
systems perspectives—that make more substantive foundations for the types of learning 
that we would like to encourage. Having identified the norms and some more desirable 
alternative starting conceptualizations (PIMs) we believe that we will be able to revise 
this activity in such a way as to improve the odds that students will emerge with more 
mathematized and science-focused understandings. 
On the one hand, we see students attending to notions of pre-existing and 
emergent mental models and at the same time we see changes in their internal models 
toward more systematized and mathematized ways of viewing science content 
knowledge. 
Patterns in students’ learning 
Looking at the students’ responses this third set of complexity-based questions as 
a whole, two categories of thinking emerged as typical. One category centered on what 
we came to call “Contagion,” where the students were paying attention to things, 
communicability or infection rates for example, associated with the transmission disease 
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through a population. The second major category focused on the “Game” aspects of the 
HubNet simulations in one way or another. Responses along these lines centered on the 
video-game nature of the participatory simulation, where students discussed their internal 
models of the simulation mainly in terms of the human-computer interface. Certainly the 
former category was preferred. 
Beyond the Contagion category, responses from a few students demonstrated 
rarer features that we see came to see as significantly better learning goals. The examples 
given in the section above are the types of student responses that we want to nurture and 
encourage. The results of this experiment have pointed to new and clear changes for the 
next—realizing what types of persistent internal models that we can expect the students 
to activate, we can design instruction to skew the results in our favor. The proposed 
instructional change here could be something as simple as direct and explicit discussion 
of the types of conceptual frameworks students have evidenced in previous iteration. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The UTeach Program at The University of Texas at Austin is an innovative pre-service 
teacher preparation program that focuses on recruiting science and mathematics students 
into education and careers as teachers. When these students graduate they have four-year 
degrees in their primary discipline as well as secondary education certification. This 
teacher preparation program has proven to be very successful and this article discusses a 
component of that success—a core requirement course called Knowing and Learning. We 
performed and report on here a teaching experiment in conjunction with that course that 
was congruent with the general design format of the course and that focused on complex 
sciences as content material and as a way of thinking about learning.  
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In keeping with the overall nature of design experimentation we sought to 
increase our theoretical understanding of learning and instruction as well as to design and 
iteratively improve a teaching unit on complexity science. As is common in Knowing and 
Learning, we invited domain expert on complex systems and learning to help design and 
execute the unit lessons and to critique the learning outcomes. Student teachers were 
engaged in learning activities that unfolded in phases and that progressed from 
behaviorist to cognitively oriented to constructivist and even to complexity-based 
learning approaches. At each stage the definition of learning, the types of learning 
activities, and the nature of assessment change in significant ways. It is an underlying 
assumption of this research that the combination of multiple means and modes of 
learning and teaching will provide unique opportunities for learning and for designing 
instruction. 
The results of the experiment were encouraging. Students learned fundamental 
complex systems ideas and terminology and were successfully introduced to multiple 
complex systems-based approaches, including a very new one that focuses on learning as 
a complex system. Our intent was to introduce the pre-service teachers to complexity as a 
subject domain, and resonant with the overall format of the Knowing and Learning 
course curriculum, as a way of structuring the way we looked at learning. The unit 
concluded with a highly interactive participatory simulation (Wilensky & Stroup, 1999) 
and a web-based structured interview that demonstrates that students could and did form 
essentially correct and potentially useful conceptions of complexity and complex 
adaptive systems learning. 
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We have provided several examples of the ways in which scientific and 
mathematical knowledge structure established ways of viewing learning. In this article 
we offer a new way of making sense of learning and teaching through a complex systems 
lens. For an individual who is considered as a complex adaptive system (Holland, 1995), 
learning becomes a sequence of events that begins with retrieving a pre-existing model 
related to the situation at hand, sampling that situation for specific details, and using 
those details to create a real-time model of the situation that enables the learner to 
anticipate and act. Considering classroom instruction from the CAS perspective enables 
the seamless coordination of various and sometimes discordant theories of learning in 
ways that may actually attend to that chronic complaint from pre-services teachers in 
learning instruction classrooms—“don’t tell me about theories, I just want to know how 
to teach!” From making sense of learning in an individual to offering structure for 
designing classroom instruction, complex adaptive systems models provide powerful new 
lenses for education research.  
END NOTE 
1 https://uteach.utexas.edu/index.cfm?objectid=371426A3-B525-84BA-









Educational research and theory building are increasingly being influenced by the 
sciences of complexity, non-linear mathematics, and systems theories. The primary 
purposes of this paper are to provide the readers with a brief introduction to dynamical 
systems1-based models of learning and to discuss a particular model that represents a step 
forward in “mathematizing2” complex systems models of human learning. This work is 
an intentional effort to try and use the mathematical to structure the social, to use 
increasingly mathematized (and “science-ized,” if you will) structures to inform our 
perspectives on classroom learning. The paper opens with the scientific, mathematical, 
and learning-theoretical contexts that situate complex systems modeling of learning and it 
goes on to discuss a particular model that seems to hold significant promise for making 
                                                
1 For a quick description of my working definitions of “complex” and “dynamic” 
systems, please see the Appendix.  
2 Lesh and Kelly (2000), have this to say about the meaning of “mathematization”: 
[M]athematics entails seeing at least as much as it entails doing.…one could say 
that doing mathematics involves (more than anything else) interpreting situations 
mathematically; that is, it involves mathematizing. When this mathematization 
takes place, it is done using constructs (e.g., conceptual models, structural 
metaphors, and other types of descriptive, explanatory systems for making sense 
of patterns and regularities in real or possible worlds). (p. 224) 
The Appendix also has a bit more to say about mathematization. 
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sense of learning at many levels of analysis from small-scale knowledge reorganizations 
in a single person, to learning in small groups, to learning in larger groups such as 
classrooms or corporations. Although this branch of learning theory research is quite 
new, data that illustrate aspects of complex learning will be presented. The paper also 
offers a brief discussion of the connections between this new theoretical model of 
learning and established cognitively and socio-culturally based learning theories (like the 
ones you’ve been studying in this class) and points toward ways the approach can be used 
by real teachers.  
 
First, What’s a System? 
 
From the standpoint of complexity theory a system is considered to be composed 
of some number of agents or elements that act in some fashion and whose behavior is 
characterized by distinct patterns of behavior when viewed from one or more 
organizational layers “up.” The important thing from a systems point of view is to be 
very clear about the boundaries of the systems and the identity of the elements that it is 
composed of. So, for example, individual ants could be thought of as the agents in the 
complex system that is the anthill, or individual bees could be the agents in the complex 
systems we call beehives.  
Well-defined systems then, are considered to be composed of lots of individual 
agents that are in turn thought of as acting according to some internal set of rules. Those 
rules, in coordination with feedback from the environment, determine how an agent will 
behave, and the organizational structure of the system (anthill, beehive) is the dynamic 
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result of the combined activities of all of the agents in the system in a kind of interactive 
dance. Very much like a “community of practice,” (Lave & Wenger, 1991), the agents, 
the environment, and the system are mutually constitutive—each affecting and having an 
effect on the other as they evolve. Not all systems are dynamic or complex, but it is the 
thesis of this paper that learning of the sort that goes on in classrooms can be reasonably 
and usefully characterized by complex systems-based models.  
 
Examples of complex systems in nature—self-organization 
The opening chapters of Self-Organization in Biological Systems (Camazine, et al., 
2001) provide an excellent description of many interesting and complex biological 
systems. From the “synchronous flashing of fireflies” (p. 8), to the ways that fish form 
into schools, to pattern formation in slime molds and bacteria, Camazine and his fellow 
authors present many clear examples of emergent complex systems in the natural world. 
The focus of this book is on one element of the theory of how these systems emerge—
self-organization: 
 Self-organization is a process in which pattern at the global level of a system 
emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level 
components of the system. Moreover, the rules specifying interactions among 
the system's components are executed using only local information, without 
reference to the global pattern. (p. 8) 
 
Beyond describing, illustrating, and closely studying many examples of complex 
systems, Camazine et. al, provide specific insights into another important feature of 
complexity systems—self-organization—and I will have more to say about that idea next. 
Self-organization the process by which pattern emerges from the activity of 
individual agents in a dynamic system. The agents act solely of their own accord, making 
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decisions based on their own internal rules systems and in response to their immediate 
environmental situation. At the next level up, which, in the case of bees would be the 
hive, a pattern emerges (the structure of the hive) that could not be anticipated from a 
close study of the activities of the individual agents. That’s a complex system. 
Another example of self-organization in biological systems is the way that geese 
organize themselves to form a V pattern in their migratory flights. Contrary to popular 
belief, there is no “head goose” directing the other geese in the flock to behave in a 
certain way. Each goose responds to its environment, probably trying to reduce wind 
resistance and perhaps keep a certain distance from its nearest neighbors, and the pattern 
of flight emerges naturally from the mutually influential activities of each of the agents.  
The concept of self-organization has implications for classroom teaching and 
learning. When students are intensely engaged in, say, a constructivist inquiry activity, 
you can actually “see” that intensity. Students are totally “on task,” and completely 
engaged in their own learning. Although it will be a difficult thing to prove, it seems 
reasonable to at least this author that what you’re seeing is students’ self-organizing their 
knowledge. In particular, the learners, and not some outside force, such as a teacher, are 
shaping their understandings. In the same way that those beautiful Vs of geese form 
without the benefit of a “head goose” ordering the other birds around, I claim that the 
most engaged and important learning that students do is very likely a self-organized 
behavior. An interesting implication of self-organization and learning that may be 




A specific type of complex system—SOCS 
 
An important subset of complex systems is the one called “self-organizing critical 
systems” (e.g., Bak & Chen, 1991). This variation on the complex systems theme is a 
larger construct than just self-organization and includes several other features that have 
important implications for learning theory. The system described by Bak and Chen was 
the formation of a sand pile like the one that forms in the bottom of an hourglass when 
the glass is turned over. Here again, the pattern that emerges—the sand pile with its 
characteristic cone shape—is the net effect of the self-organizing activity of thousands of 
agents (grains of sand). While moment to moment details of which sand ends up where is 
a series of random events and quite unpredictable, the conically shaped pile (and even its 
“angle of repose”) is completely predictable—that same shape emerges every time the 
hourglass is turned over. Now rather than being decisions per se, as in the case of a 
human learner, self-organization in this case just means that every grain behaves 
according to a particular set of characteristics that act like rules (for example, size, shape, 
weight, roughness) and determine how the grain moves and how it affects the other 
agents and the overall system. Again, the interrelationships between sand grains and the 
system are mutually constitutive.  
In addition to the idea of self-organization, Bak and Chen’s (1991) variation of 
systems theory provides us with two other useful notions for making sense of these types 
of systems. The first notion is that these self-organizing critical systems (SOCS) are said 
to be “self-similar.” So, in the case of the sand pile that grows upward in the bottom of an 
hourglass, the fallen grains of sand will re-organize every time another grain of sand 
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drops onto the top of the pile. These re-organizations, or little avalanches of sand, occur 
continually as the sand pile grows. Some of the avalanches may be very small, consisting 
of only a few grains of sand that move a short distance down the pile and then stop. A 
much smaller number of re-organizations may be relatively large and consist of hundreds 
or thousands of sand grains that avalanche and tumble all the way to the bottom of the 
pile. Self-similar here means that one re-organization (avalanche) “looks” very much like 
another, with the only real difference being that of relative size. This phenomenon is also 
referred to as “scale invariance” which means that the system “looks” the same at various 
scales or levels of magnification. A good illustration of self-similarity can be seen in 
“fractal patterns” where, again, the pattern of pixels in the fractal looks similar at many 
levels of magnification. 
 
Figure 1. 
             
       
The same fractal image at 4 levels of magnification. (Retrieved from 




Another illustration of SOCS theory provided by Bak and Chen (1991) is their 
discussion of “sensitivity to initial conditions.” Going back to the avalanches that occur 
as the sand pile builds, what determines whether an avalanche will be large or small are 
the “initial conditions” that existed just before the grain of sand hits. In this case, the 
initial conditions are the relative instability of the sand pile that resulted from the last 
reorganizations and things like the speed, rotation, and size of the falling grain of sand. If 
the sand pile is very unstable, with many grains of sand perched precariously on the 
edges of others, one more grain of sand may cause a very large avalanche. If a new grain 
of sand hits the pile when it is relatively stable, the size of the resulting avalanche may be 
very small. It may even be that a single grain of sand will drop and cause no avalanche at 
all—it could just come to rest perfectly balanced on top of another grain of sand! In that 
case, it is safe to say that the pile is likely to be less stable after the event, and set up 
conditions conducive to a larger re-organization later. In any event, the consequences of 
every falling grain event is heavily dependent on how previous events have affected the 
relative stability of the sand pile. 
To summarize, self-organization is the property of complex systems that describes 
their ability to produce very clear patterns of activity at one level through the independent 
activities of agents at a lower level of organization. Self-organizing critical systems are 
sensitive to initial conditions, which means that future states of the system are highly 
dependent on earlier states of the system. Small differences in the initial conditions can 
result in large differences in subsequent reorganizations. SOCS are self-similar, meaning 
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that their activity at one level of observation looks very much like their activity at a 
different level of “magnification” as it were.  
At this point, you are probably asking yourself what all this SOCS business has to 
do with learning in individuals and classrooms, and it is this question that I will attend to 
next. 
 
SOCS in classrooms 
 
Self-organizing critical systems theories are strikingly congruent with many 
aspects of cognitive learning theories and with constructivist philosophies. One can view 
learning itself as a SOCS, where, for example, the patterns of learning in a classroom 
emerge from the self-organized behaviors of individual learners.  
Each of the individual “agents” in the classroom is making her or his decisions 
and knowledge re-organizations in a direct response to local conditions and personal 
initial conditions. Constructivists and cognitive learning theorists studying reading have 
known for a long time that what children learn is highly correlated with the knowledge 
and experiences that they bring with them into the classroom. What some call prior or 
background knowledge complexity scientists would call a subset of the “intitial 
conditions” of the system. 
At another level, knowledge structures (like those discussed in the expert-novice 
chapter of How People Learn, NRC, 1999) within an individual reorganize as a function 
of reflection and experience. Piaget’s notions of assimilation and accommodation can 
also be viewed as re-organizations of knowledge. The similarities between the image of 
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the small and large avalanches on sand pile in an hourglass and small and large scale re-
organizations of learner’s knowledge seems quite useful. In another paper I have 
discussed (Hurford, 1998) the nature of these types of re-organizations (what are 
sometimes called “ah-hah moments”) and how they are a feature of learning. I would be 
happy to provide you with a copy of this paper upon request. 
The last feature of SOCS that I will discuss in relation to human learning is this 
notion of stability and instability of structures. Just like the falling grains of sand in an 
hourglass result in changes in the relative stability of the sand pile, one can imagine that 
new knowledge and experience can cause changes in the stability of learners’ knowledge 
structures. At this juncture, I see a strong correlation between SOCS theory and Piaget’s 
“disequilibrium.” Both describe a state of the system that is very unstable and that 
unstable state is viewed as a necessary precursor to change in the system.  
Now all of these comparisons between self-organizing critical systems theories 
and cognitive and constructivist views of learning are to this point strictly metaphorical. 
However, even at this relatively low level of mathematization the construct of SOCS 
offers teachers and learners alike useful ideas about how and why learning may happen. 
For example, SOCS theory provides a plausible reason for why activating prior 
knowledge is important for learning. It also lets learners know that their understandings 
will necessarily go through chaotic and stable phases, and that the chaotic phase, where a 
learner feels like he or she suddenly knows nothing at all about the subject he/she has 
been studying all week is actually a re-organization phase of knowledge development, 
and that that is a good thing. It’s good because it lets the learner know that progress is 
being made and that a new level of stable understanding is likely to be just around the 
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bend. It tells us that small knowledge structure re-organizations are happening all the 
time and that a big ah-hah!, where lots of things fall into place, can happen at any time 
and that the only way not to learn about something is to not engage with it.  
So, if we just think about learning as self-organizing, systems theory helps us to 
develop constructs, to mathematize our thinking about learning. If we go a step further, 
and think about Bak and Chen’s (1991) SOCS model, we have mathematized our 
construct of teaching and learning still further. At this level, we have taken into account 
the natural behavior of complex systems and extended our metaphor so that it covers 
more ground and considers plausible reasons for how and why learning happens. 
Furthermore, complex systems constructs have the ability to combine insights from 
multiple theories of learning into a more cohesive and understandable whole. There is 
another layer of increased mathematization that is actually the central focus of this paper, 
and it is this model of learning that we turn to next.  
 
Learning as a Complex Adaptive System 
 
Perhaps the most promising discussion of complex systems for theory-building about 
classroom learning is John Holland’s 1995 book, Hidden Order. In this work, Holland 
takes on the task of attempting to lay out and define a prototypical, complete, and 
universal complex adaptive system. Holland’s model is focused on complex systems that 
can adapt, based on feedback from their environments, in order to be more successful at. 
He believes that it is possible identify a set of ten attributes that all complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) can be seen to possess (Holland, 1995, pp. 6-10). He describes CAS as 
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being fundamentally characterized by the presence of agents, meta-agents, and 
adaptation, and says that these three attributes can be understood and studied in terms of 
the “seven basics”—four “properties” (aggregation, nonlinearity, flows, and diversity) 
and three “mechanisms" (tagging, internal models, and building blocks) (Chap. 1).  
The attributes—adaptation, agents, that can be seen as aggregating into meta-
agents—and the mechanisms and properties serve at least two purposes. First, they can be 
used in deciding whether or not a system under study can indeed be thought of as a CAS, 
and second, the features, mechanisms, and properties provide analytical tools for 
investigating the nature of that system. Holland’s book represents an ambitious effort to 
create a general model of complex adaptive systems, a class of things that can profitably 
be used to study learning in many contexts. A brief discussion of the attributes, 
mechanisms, and properties is offered below. 
 
Attributes 
First, Holland (1995) sets out the notions of agents, meta-agents, and adaptation as 
being present in all CAS and necessary if a system is to be categorized as such. The 
agents, “active elements” that are “diverse in both form and capability” (p. 6) are seen to 
act, to behave, as if they were responding to an internal set of rules. He is quick to point 
out that these hypothesized rule sets are not necessarily the rules that govern the behavior 
of the agents, or that rule sets are actually what determine the agents’ behaviors. Instead, 
thinking of the agents as rules-driven in this way provides “a convenient way to describe 
agent strategies” (p. 8).  
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Next, Holland employs a common tactic in systems analyses by moving up a level 
and discussing “meta-agents” as being a way of thinking about “what CAS do” (p. 11, 
italics in the original)—meta-agents are higher-level agents whose behavior patterns 
result from the aggregated combination of the behaviors of the agents a level down in the 
hierarchy. In the same way, meta-agents can aggregate into “meta-meta-agents,” thus 
creating “the hierarchical organization so typical of CAS” (p. 9). To summarize, CAS are 
composed of active agents that behave as if responding to an internal rules structure, and 
their behaviors at the local level combine to create patterns of activity higher-level meta-
agents. Those meta-agents can likewise be thought of as agents operating in still higher 
complex adaptive systems.  
Adaptation, “the sine qua non3 ”of CAS (Holland, 1995, p. 8) is a feature of all CAS 
and Holland often relies on biological metaphors to characterize this attribute. He says 
that adaptation is how the “organism fits itself to its environment,” and that “experience 
guides changes in the organism’s structure… [in order to] make better use of its 
environment for its own ends” (p. 9). If agents act as if they were responding to an 
internal set of rules, then a way for them to learn is by modifying those rules in response 
to experience. Rules sets can thus be “viewed as hypotheses that are undergoing testing 
and confirmation” (p. 53). Holland’s treatment goes into significant detail about how the 
transformation of rules might proceed, but it is sufficient for the present purpose to say 
that the process is recursive, based on information from the environment (feedback) that 
the agent is immersed in, and results in reorganizations of rules sets.  
                                                
3 “without this, nothing”. 
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Another aspect of Holland’s (1995) view of adaptation needs to be discussed, 
because it sheds light on the ways in which patterns emerge from the activity of 
individual agents. Each agent’s environment is partly composed of other agents, “so that 
a portion of any agent’s efforts at adaptation is spent adapting to other adaptive agents. 
This one feature is a major source of the temporal patterns that CAS generate” (p. 10). 
The agents of a complex adaptive system are constantly adapting to their environment, 
and that environment includes other adapting agents, and the net effect is the evolution of 
distinct patterns of activity when viewed from “one level up.”  
At this point the notion of adaptation is probably sufficiently defined for the 
purposes of this essay: adaptation is learning (e.g., changing internal rules-sets) based 
upon interactions that the agent has with its environment. A major component of that 
environment is other adaptive agents, and the patterns of activity generated by agents’ 
individual and mutual adaptation provide the observable organizational patterns. It is also 
important to note that, as agents and their behaviors evolve, so does their external 
environment. Although Holland doesn’t discuss this explicitly, I believe the idea that 
agents and their environs can be seen as being mutually adaptive provides an additional 
and potentially useful piece to the puzzle of CAS. 
 
The Seven Basics: Mechanisms and Properties 
 
These “seven basics”—the mechanisms and properties—that Holland (1995) 
considers common characteristics of all CAS “are not the only basics that could be 
selected” (p. 10) as ways of understanding the activity of complex adaptive systems.  He 
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reminds us that, as researchers, we still need to be a bit artful, choosing which 
characteristics will provide useful foci for particular investigations for particular 
purposes. “This is not so much a matter of correct or incorrect… as it is a matter of what 
questions are being investigated” (p. 8). At the same time, Holland intends his work to 
generate a model that can be used for studying all CAS and he writes that “all the other 
candidates” for mechanisms and properties that he’s encountered can be “derived” from 
“combinations of these seven” (p. 10). The mechanisms—tagging, building blocks, and 
internal models—are how CAS act and how they adapt. The properties—diversity, flows, 





Tagging is the process of complex adaptive system’s identifying features in its 
environment that are relevant in determining its future activity. A CAS selects particular 
features (building blocks) from all the possible stimuli in its environment as a function of 
a currently active set of tagging rules. Tagging rules structure agents’ parsing their 
environments by motivating and driving selective attention. When a CAS first encounters 
a situation, a preexisting set of tagging rules relevant to the particular situation becomes 
active, and the rules specify particular things for the CAS to expect (or not expect), and to 
look for. In CAS, tagging is the means by which “building blocks” are extracted from 
experience in a “perpetually novel environment” (p. 34), and the selected building blocks 
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are subsequently assembled into an internal model of the complex adaptive system’s 
environment.  
As has been pointed out, the building blocks mechanism refers to the complex 
adaptive system’s means for creating and adapting useful internal models. A CAS 
identifies building blocks according to the operative tagging rules, it isolates those bits of 
information in its environment and combines and re-combines them into internal models. 
As an example, consider the enormous number of variations generated in the process of 
police artists’ creating composite drawings of suspects from general sets of facial 
components (Holland, 1995, pp. 34-36). In the same way that composite sketches are 
created, complex adaptive systems combine building blocks and generate internal models 
of their environments. 
The activity patterns of a CAS are directed by means of the third mechanism, 
internal models. The major functions of internal models are to enable the CAS to 
anticipate the consequences of future actions and to subsequently adapt its behaviors in 
order to become more successful at satisfying its needs. Depending on a multitude of 
factors, anticipation and internal models may be unconscious, as is the case in a 
bacterium or in automatic functions (Anderson, 1983) in learners, or very conscious as in 
the case of a person’s using instructions from a friend to navigate in an unfamiliar city. 
Internal models are real-time and transitory representations of the more-or-less local 
environment of a CAS that provide it with the means for anticipating possible outcomes 
of its activity. Internal representations are transitory because they are continually being 
adapted in response to feedback from the rest of the system. In addition to adaptation of 
internal models, the tagging rules set that was driving the process of internal model-
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building may be permanently altered as a consequence of experience, and the adapted 




Beyond the attributes and mechanisms of CAS, Holland (1995) presents a list of 
four properties that further serve to characterize complex adaptive systems: diversity, 
flows, non-linearity, and aggregation. At this time, I think of the properties as 
descriptive—as a sort of a laundry list of observables that help in making the 
determination as to whether a system is a CAS or not. If a thing is a CAS, then one ought 
to be able to identify the four properties in its activity; if the properties aren’t in evidence, 
then it’s probably not a CAS. It seems likely that the properties will mature into the 
central foci of complexity-based approaches to learning and teaching, because for 
example, it’s in studying the diversity and non-linearity of CAS that one is apt to locate 
the “lever points” (p. 97) that enable large changes from small inputs. At present 
however, the mechanisms alone occupy center stage in my research. 
 
CAS and learning: Summary and assumptions 
 
In complex adaptive systems, stored sets of tagging rules are activated based upon 
the environmental context and the rules cause the CAS to look for particular affordances 
in the current situation. As these affordances (building blocks) are identified, they 
combine to generate an internal model of the situation (Holland, 1995, p. 37) that enables 
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the CAS to anticipate likely outcomes of its future activity. Real-time internal models are 
transitory and evolving, depending upon the changing environment and the relative 
fruitfulness of the activities based on the internal model. As time passes what persist are 
the tagging rules sets, which may also have adapted, and which will be retained by the 
complex adaptive system later use. The properties of non-linearity, diversity, flows, and 
aggregation are the ways in which CAS behave as functions of the mechanisms that drive 
them. 
Two general assumptions of my research are: 1) that individual learners, groups 
of learners, or entire classrooms are complex adaptive systems; and 2) that adaptation in 
these CAS is synonymous with learning. As described above, an important attribute of 
CAS is that they are composed of agents that aggregate into meta-agents. In a classroom, 
one can think of individual learners as agents and groups or the entire classroom as meta-
agents whose patterns of activity arise from the activity of agents (individual students) at 
the next level down.  
Similarly, an individual learner can be considered to be a meta-agent, whose 
activity is the observable pattern generated by interacting agents—the agent’s own, 
competing, internal models. To borrow a metaphor from Toulmin (1972), a learner’s 
internal models taken together constitute a “conceptual ecology.” An individual learner’s 
conceptual ecology can be seen to possess all of the attributes, mechanisms, and 
properties present in Holland’s (1995) model of a complex adaptive system. Learning in 
these systems consists of the development of real time internal models and assimilation 
and accommodation of feedback information into persistent tagging rules sets. 
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An Example of the Mechanisms 
 
 Perhaps understanding of the mechanisms will be aided by a real-world example 
of how they might work. Imagine that it’s getting dark as you’re driving in an unfamiliar 
part of your city with a lot of road construction—you’re coming up to an intersection and 
preparing to make a right turn onto a cross street. As you approach the intersection, you 
look down the cross street in anticipation of the turn. At this point, a generic two-way 
street tagging rules set (TRS1) becomes active in your mind and you begin to sample 
your environment based on the following rules:  
 
  TRS1—Two-way streets 
If it’s a two-way street, then 
 
• Expect a centerline stripe. 
• Look for cars moving in two directions. 
• Expect cars to be parked facing away from you on the left side of 
the street, and toward you on the right side. 
• Look for some signs with their faces toward you, some with their 
backs toward you. 
 
As you get closer to the street you realize that it is under construction and that the things 
you’d expected to find are not entirely in evidence. What you see is that there are three 
parked cars, and they’re all facing you. You can only see two signs on as you look down 
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the street, and they’re both facing away from you. In addition, there are no visible stripes 
on the roadway and no cars moving along the street. 
 TRS 1 has proven to be increasingly unsuccessful in helping you decide on a 
course for future action. As its fruitfulness fades, a second set of tagging rules becomes 
active. TRS 2 is a one-way street tagging rules set: 
 
  TRS 2—One-way streets 
If it’s a one-way street, then 
 
• Expect a sign announcing that the street is a one-way street. 
• Look for cars moving in one direction. 
• Expect all cars to be parked facing in one direction. 
• Expect all signs to be facing in one direction or the other. 
 
You immediately begin sampling the environment for these salient features and you find 
that the first condition is not met but now there’s a car coming toward you. Again you 
notice the three cars on the street (all facing you), and the two signs that you can see are 
indeed facing away from you.  
 This information spontaneously combines to generate a real-time internal model 
that causes you to turn off your right turn signal and continue traveling up the street 
you’re presently on. The model that has emerged looks something like this: “There’s a 
car coming toward me, the parked cars on the street are all facing toward me, and the 
signs are all facing away from me. There isn’t a one-way street sign, but this is a 
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construction area, so maybe the workmen haven’t gotten around to putting all of the signs 
up. I’m going to treat it as if it were a one-way street opposing me, and try the next 
street.” TRS 2 has helped you to identify a set of building blocks (cars, signs, etc.) that 
were present in your environment these and these were put together to form a real-time 
internal model that enabled you to make sense of your experience.  
 As you approach the next cross-street, you notice a one-way street sign facing 
you, and several parked cars all pointing away from you on both sides of the street. You 
also notice one car traveling away from you and that there are no signs along the street 
with their backs to you. You confidently signal and turn right onto the street. While 
you’re doing this, a new set of tagging rules presents itself and TRS 2 is amended (TRS 
2.1) and fades away for the time being. 
 
  TRS 2.1 
• Expect a sign announcing that the street is a one-way street. 
• Look for cars moving in one direction. 
• Expect all cars to be parked facing in one direction. 
• Expect all signs to be facing in one direction or the other. 
• Look for cars pointing the same direction and parked on both sides 
of the street. 
 
In complex adaptive systems, stored sets of tagging rules are activated based on 
cues from the environment and they tell the CAS to look for particular affordances in the 
current situation. As these affordances (building blocks) are identified, they are combined 
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to generate a tentative internal model of the situation (Holland, 1995, p. 37) that enables 
the CAS to anticipate likely outcomes of its future activity. Real-time internal models are 
transitory and evolving, depending upon the changing environment and the relative 
fruitfulness of the complex adaptive system’s activity. What persists is the tagging rules 
set, which may itself adapt and which will be retained by the complex adaptive system 
later use.  
 
CAS and Learning in Classrooms 
 
 Two general assumptions in this paper are: 1) that individual learners, groups of 
learners, or entire classrooms are complex adaptive systems; and 2) that adaptation in 
these CAS is synonymous with learning. As described above, an attribute of CAS is that 
they include agents and meta-agents. In a classroom, one can view individual learners as 
agents and small groups or the entire classroom as meta-agents whose patterns of activity 
arise from the activity of agents at the next level down. At the same time, a learner can be 
considered to be a meta-agent, whose activity is the outward pattern generated by some 
number of its interacting internal models. To borrow a metaphor from Toulmin (1972), a 
learner’s internal models taken together constitute a “conceptual ecology”—a complex 
adaptive system that exhibits all of the attributes, mechanisms, and properties present in 
Holland’s (1995) model of a complex adaptive system.  
For the purposes of the current research project, I have chosen to focus on 
individual learners and to consider each to be a complex adaptive system. The reasons for 
choosing individual learners as the focus are three-fold. First, although conscious thought 
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and decision making are not requisite criteria for CAS, it is much easier to make the 
connection between a model of a complex adaptive system and the system itself if at least 
some of the tagging rule decisions are made consciously. Second, much if not all of 
human behavior is goal-directed, and the use of internal models in the anticipation and 
acquisition of goals is well motivated. Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, the CAS 
model being discussed here has much in common with the current cognitive literature and 
research understandings of individual learners. It is my hope that in the research that 
follows that I can present a description of individual learning that is plausible, relatively 




Methods and Approach 
 
This is a pilot investigation in a study of individual and group learning as complex 
adaptive systems. The primary purpose of the study is to instantiate a new theoretical 
framework for making sense of human learning and to generate plausible means for 
identifying the three mechanisms (Holland, 1995) that complex systems use in 
adaptation. The subjects of this pilot study were nine university students, several of 
whom were pre-service mathematics and science teachers. Their participation was 
voluntary and there was a small stipend paid. The results are intended to be strictly 
descriptive.  
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The research reported here is a close study of one of the nine learners that were 
engaged in a networked simulation—the HubNet participatory simulation (Wilensky & 
Stroup, 1999; 2000) known as Gridlock. Participatory simulations are networked 
activities where learners act out the roles of elements in the system and observe the 
behavior of the system as a whole as patterns emerge from their individual behaviors. 
These results then become the focus of participants’ discussions and analyses. Using 
network technology with a public display space where traffic flows and the city’s streets 
are projected at the front of the classroom, each learner controls a stoplight and together 
they work toward improving the flow of traffic through the city.  
When introduced to the gridlock activity, students were presented with the 
following scenario: The mayor of the City of Gridlock is unhappy with the traffic 
congestion in town and she has commissioned the class to improve the situation 
(Wilensky & Stroup, 2000). The goal of the activity is for the students to find ways of 
optimizing traffic flow for the simulated city and to report back to the mayor. Students 
are asked what they know about traffic flow and the learners articulate a wide range of 
factors that can impact complex phenomena like traffic. During the simulation, students 
control individual traffic lights and also call out directions and negotiate strategies with 
each other. In addition to an introduction to the Gridlock activity, participants received 
instruction in the use of concept mapping (Novak & Gowin, 1984) at the beginning of 
this study. 
Data collection and analysis 
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The data for this study consisted of participants’ concept maps of how city traffic 
flows done before and after the simulations, videotaped records of all the activity, a 
videotaped interview with one of the participants, and observer field notes. In addition, 
the entire state of the simulation, including participants’ key-presses, the upfront 
projection, and the real-time flow of traffic, was recorded for every run of the simulation. 
All data has been analyzed for evidence of tagging rules, building blocks, and internal 
models, and for how these mechanisms evolved throughout the course of the activities. 
The pre- and post-activity concept maps were compared in an effort to characterize 
changes in participants’ “traffic flow internal models.” The data are intended mainly to 




 The results being reported here are a close study of the adaptation of one of the 
male participants in the simulations. Although the focus in this paper is on a single 
individual situated in a group learning experience a central claim of the CAS perspective 
on learning is that it is applicable and has value for making sense of learning at multiple 
levels I will return to a brief discussion of a group level discussion of CAS learning in my 
concluding remarks.  
The table below contains excerpted transcriptions of the participant’s 
contributions to the group discussions together with brief analyses of the meanings 
attributed to these statements vis-à-vis a complex adaptive systems model of learning. 
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The data from this study is rich, and only a small portion of the analysis of the study can 
be reported here. 
 
Table A1. The left hand column is the transcription of the participant’s conversations, the 
right hand column is the analysis. 
Participant Comment Analysis 
1. One thing I’ve noticed about doing this--it’s 
very hard to pay attention to what’s going on at 
the other lights to try and see if there’s any 
patterns about how things work... without 
ignoring my own light and jamming up my 
intersection.… Every time I look and see if 
there’s any patterns for how the lights are 
going and how the traffic’s flowing then I have 
to let go of my intersection and let it jam up…  
Building Blocks. The participant is 
pointing out what he’s looking at, the 
salient features that he’s sampling in 
his environment: other lights, patterns, 
his own light. He’s looking only at the 
simulation as it’s unfolding in trying to 
make sense of the emergent 
phenomena. His tagging rules are 
causing him to focus closely on actual 
activity in a very localized region 
around his traffic light. 
2. I’d see all the green lights were moving this 
way and then this way and there’s a pattern 
there... 
Building Blocks. The participant is 
telling us which components of his 
environment he’s sampling—patterns 
of green lights flowing through the 
system.  
3. My intuition’s telling me you want some 
alternating pattern, red, you know… there’s 
two variables each place here but you know, 
you want to set it up the lights to go red, green, 
red, green, red, green, and to alternate going 
through the system. 
Internal Model. His “intuition” is really 
an emergent internal model about how 
to improve traffic flow. 
4. I think the first thing we should do is every 
time there’s a clock tick, every body switches 
their light. So the board’s set up, right now, the 
vertical lines are going and the horizontal lines 
are stopped. 
Internal Model. The model he’s 
building now includes a temporal 
component along with the alternation of 
red and green lights. 
5. Another participant: Is that your measure 
down there [pointing at Average Wait Time 
graph]? How the traffic is [flowing]? 
Building Blocks. This is the first time 
that any of the participants has 
mentioned any of the graphical 
presentations of data in the up-front 
space. 
6. We need some sort of time clock. Tagging Rule. The participant’s 
operative rules set is beginning to look 
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for building blocks that are  
“better” than just the information in the 
traffic grid itself. 
7. There need to be time scales on the graphs. 
So we can see whether these wave motions 
have anything to do with our time… between 
lights [switching]. It’s just if there were 
crosshairs... we could see where that was; and 
we could say if these were nine second bumps 
or two second bumps. 
Building Blocks. The first participant 
immediately seizes on the graph—
putting the graphical information, 
timescales between lights changes, and 
traffic flows together.  
8. I’m just trying to reconcile the average 
speed not changing much and the average wait 
time going way up. The average speed over the 
whole second fifty seconds is about the same 
as average speed over the whole first fifty 
seconds, but the average wait time over the 
second fifty seconds is like two or three times 
what it is over the first fifty seconds.  
Building Blocks. The participant is 
comparing two different potential 
building blocks, and trying to make 
sense of the apparent conflict.  
9. Yeah... there’s gotta’ be some sort of math 
about the number of cars that are stopped... that 
makes that iron out.   
Tagging Rules. This is relative to the 
above conflict. It’s important to note 
that now his set of tagging rules is 
beginning to look for mathematized 
building blocks to try and resolve the 
conflict. 
10. I guess I’m thinking from the standpoint of 
the hypothetical person running for election 
(the Mayor of Gridlock). The number of 
people that get to work get to work at the same 
time in simulation one as in simulation two, 
but they’re going to perceive that it’s going 
slower in simulation two because they wait 
longer.…  So if you had to choose, from the 
standpoint of someone wanting to get 
reelected… it matters definitely--you want five 
seconds as opposed to ten seconds, but it 
doesn’t matter practically because the speeds 
are staying the same. 
Internal Model. The participant is 
discussing two competing internal 
models for improving traffic flows. In 
simulation one, the time between 
changes in the traffic lights is five 
seconds. In simulation two, the time 
between changes is ten seconds. 
However, in sampling information 
(building blocks) from the two graphs, 
the average speed of the cars graph is 
the same whether the time between 
changes is five seconds or ten seconds. 
His internal model therefore says, the 
traffic will seem improve if cars wait 
only five seconds, because a shorter 
wait will be seen as better, even though 
the average speed of the traffic remains 
unchanged. 
11. We are definitely getting into a problem 
here which is a psychological problem. What 
will drivers think as opposed to how fast will 
Tagging Rules. Here we see the 
participant’s rules sets are changing 
again—he’s moving from sampling 
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they actually get to work? graphical/mathematical building blocks 
to looking for psychological building 
blocks. 
12. How do people actually think? I mean... I 
don’t know, I’ve never really thought about 
this. I know that I tend to get emotionally more 
frustrated by being stopped. How general is 
that? Is that something that affects everybody? 
Are they really going to vote on the basis of 
how long they’re stopped? Because from a 
practical standpoint you’d want to use that 
graph in the middle—which just gives you the 
average speed—you want to maximize the 
speed through the grid. But is that how people 
are going to vote? 
Building Block. The question for the 
participant here is what to choose as 
building blocks for his internal 
model—strictly mathematical data, or 
information based on the psychological 
perceptions of drivers. 
 
 
Affordances of CAS View of Learning 
 
 It is important to point out that Holland’s (1995) complex adaptive systems model 
is only one of a large number of potentially useful and productive systems theoretical 
approaches to studying learning. For example, Hurford (1998) discusses a self-organizing 
critical systems perspective on conceptual change. A case can be made, for saying that 
much of experiential learning is self-organized learning, and systems lenses like the one 
provided by Camazine, et al., (2001) may provide the tools for getting at important 
insights into individual and group learning. There has already been a good deal of work 
done in characterizing learning at the level of organizations (Senge, 1995; Sterman, 2000) 
using systems dynamics tools and software and much more remains to be done in this 
direction.  
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  The theoretical perspective presented here has much in common with learning 
theories based on individual cognition. It includes elements of conceptual change models 
(Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1996; Hurford, 1998; Strike & Posner, 1992; Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1987) and cognitive structures (di Sessa, 1993). A CAS view of learning also 
sees learners as changing their conceptual structures and it extends the former 
perspectives, situating conceptual changes in persistent tagging rules sets. A CAS view of 
learning is like constructivist perspectives (Cobb, 1994; Piaget, 1929/1951; Steffe & 
Gale, 1995), in that learners are actively constructing knowledge, but it points to the 
mechanisms (tagging rules, building blocks, and internal models) and attends to the 
emergence of structures (Piaget, 1968/1970), by which constructivist learning is believed 
to occur. The CAS view of learning meshes with schema-theoretic perspectives (Derry, 
1996; Schank, 1996), the tagging rules are schemata (Holland, 1995, p. 90). At the same 
time the perspective presented in this paper adds a layer to schema theories—the real-
time and transitory internal models that constantly change are seen to continuously and 
dynamically update as functions of experience and the local environment. The 
combination of internal models and experience feeds back to persistent schemata (tagging 
rules sets) and adapts them. The CAS view of learning also has something to add to 
expert-novice perspectives (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000; Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & 
Resnick, 2000) because, as discussed above, it provides a way of thinking about 
mechanisms and trajectories for learners’ progressing from novice to expert. 
This approach is different from all of the above though, in that it also supports a 
perspective relative to learning at the group level. An attribute of dynamical systems is 
that they are self-similar—they possess features that are either the same (e.g., a Koch 
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snowflake) or very nearly the same (e.g., fractals) over a wide range of scales. This is a 
very important affordance of a CAS perspective on learning, the same lens that has been 
applied here is can be applied to learning at the group level. The tagging rules, building 
blocks, and internal models seen at the level of the individual were identified in this 
research study at the group level as well. A complex adaptive systems analysis of group 
learning is will be reported on in future work 
In this group sense, a CAS view offers an alternative framework for Cobb’s 
group-level symbolic interactionism (Cobb, 1994)—the CAS lens is a semi-
mathematized structure for thinking about how ideas, learning, and knowledge emerge 
and adapt in classrooms. Beyond Cobb’s view of the social space, CAS learning is 
congruent with the proposed “mathematics structuring the social space” (MS3) 
perspective (Stroup, Ares, and Hurford, 2005). MS3 considers activity in classrooms as 
being generally structured by mathematical understandings, a CAS perspective on 
classrooms brings a particular (dynamical systems) lens to MS3 and gets us one step 
closer to mathematized models for learning at a wide range of scales. 
 
An Extension of Holland’s Model and Connections to the Literature on Learning 
 
Tagging, according to John Holland (1995) is a mechanism for identifying features in 
the environment of a CAS that are salient in determining its future activity. A CAS 
selects salient features (building blocks) from all the possible inputs in its environment as 
a function of a currently active set of tagging criteria. Tagging structures agents’ parsing 
their environments by driving selective attention. When a CAS first encounters a 
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particular situation, an existing set of tagging criteria relevant to the situation becomes 
active, and the tags specify things for the CAS to expect (or not expect), and to look for. 
In CAS the tagging mechanism is the means by which “building blocks” are rendered 
from experience in a “perpetually novel environment” (p. 34), and the building blocks are 
subsequently assembled into a real time internal model of the complex adaptive system’s 
environment.   
As envisioned by Holland, tagging is a universal mechanism of all complex 
adaptive systems, however I believe there is something very different and important 
between the behaviors of ants (Gordon, 1995), bees and birds (Camazine, et al., 2002), or 
computer programs (Holland, 1995, 1998), and human behaviors. I propose a more 
sophisticated and specifically human mechanism that extends Holland’s (1995) tagging4. 
I refer to this mechanism as “persistent internal models” (PIMs) and distinguish them 
from the “real-time internal models” (RIMs, these are the same as Holland’s “internal 
models” mechanism) that complex adaptive systems form in the course of activity. 
Persistent internal models are more than just tagging rules sets—I envision them as whole 
conceptual structures possessing both declarative and procedural information that the 
learner keeps in long-term memory and that are activated by the learner’s context.  
Persistent internal models have the same function as tagging mechanisms—they 
direct attention and enable the acquisition of building blocks for composition into real-
time internal models. PIMs also store knowledge and experience for future use. At the 
same time, they are more than just rules-sets: what I am calling PIMs (in this CAS 
                                                
4 I have discussed elsewhere the dangers of “co-optation and renaming” of terms and in 
the interests of brevity, omitted that discussion here. 
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context) have elsewhere been called schemata (e.g., Piaget, 1968, pp. 81-83), conceptual 
structures (Strike & Posner, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987), cognitive structures 
(diSessa, 1993), mental models (Gentner & Stevens, 1983), scripts (Abelson & Schank, 
1977) and simply “models” (Lesh & Doerr, 2003). While I recognize that these ideas are 
not necessarily identical to each other and that my sense of PIMs is derivative of all of 
them, I use these examples to help illustrate my conception. I have elected to retain this 
new term, persistent internal model, as being more congruent with Holland’s (1995) CAS 
model and at the same time trying to avoid terms that “[carry] too much unintended 
conceptual baggage” (Lesh & Doerr, 2003, p. 8). 
Particular PIMs, persistent conceptual structures, become active based on the 
learner’s current context. Then they help the learner to form a real time internal model 
(RIM) of the context, and that real time model enables the learner to make sense of his or 
her environment and to anticipate likely results of activity and behaviors. PIMs help to 
structure RIMs by enabling the learner to select building blocks (bits of information) from 
its situation and then to assemble them, by substituting them into appropriate places in 
the existing PIM framework (this is very similar to Schank’s notion of scripts, but see 
below). The old PIM framework, having been thus restructured by information in the 
learner’s immediate environment, becomes the real time internal model. As the name 
implies, RIMs are constantly being updated and revised as time proceeds. As the 
situation changes, alternative PIMs may become active in response the changes and the 
existing RIMs are replaced with new ones. The previous PIMs may have been altered to 
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some degree based upon the experience, and the restructured PIM is what gets stored for 
the future.  
As I alluded to above, what I am describing here has a lot in common with Abelson  & 
Schank’s (1977) scripts. It also is derivative of work on conceptual change theories and 
Piaget’s notions of assimilation and accommodation. What is different, and I claim what 
adds value to a CAS learning approach is the inclusiveness of the CAS model. The CAS 
model is a whole picture of learning that can parsimoniously combine many current 
learning models into a larger and more cohesive package. Although a detailed account of 
the particulars is beyond the scope of the current paper, much of my motivation for the 
development of a CAS model of learning comes from the fact that such a model has the 
potential for connecting previous models of learning and for filling in the spaces between 
them. It is in the interests of this overall project that this CAS learning model is being 
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